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> This has some notoriously odd results (known as the “paradoxes of material implication”) > You’ll still get weird results (known as the “paradoxes of strict
by skissane 5y ago
> This has some notoriously odd results (known as the “paradoxes of material implication”)
> You’ll still get weird results (known as the “paradoxes of strict implication”)
This is obviously building up to the concept of relevance logic (called "relevant logic" in the UK and Australia) – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-relevance/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-relevance/ – and no doubt Feser knows about it, but isn't taking the reader there. It seems to me an odd omission.
A lot of his argument is actually against classical logic, not formal logic. Many philosophers and logicians agree that classical formal logic is deeply flawed, and have proposed various non-classical formal logics in response (relevance logic, constructivist/intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, among others). But in this blog post he doesn't interact with or mention any of that work.
> To show that the eternalist conclusion really follows, and does not merely falsely appear to do so, would require independent metaphysical argumentation
I've never understood how Feser manages to believe in both presentism and divine eternity. In my mind they are mutually exclusive propositions. Atheism and process theism / open theism both go well with presentism. But the eternal God of classical theism, who knows all of time as one single moment, seems to me to have an eternalist approach to time as an inevitable consequence.