5 ms·
I hate to say it, but if what you're communicating could risk your life or that of someone else you might want to avoid using computers to communicate it altoge
by pmoriarty 5y ago
I hate to say it, but if what you're communicating could risk your life or that of someone else you might want to avoid using computers to communicate it altogether.
Old-school techniques such as physically smuggling microdots[1] seem much safer than relying on any computer technology, which can always be hacked.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microdot https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microdot
- dogorman 5y agoIf these hacking firms succeed in chasing journalists off digital communication, I think the totalitarian regimes they serve will consider that "a win."
- pmoriarty 5y agoIt's arguably an even bigger "win" for them if they kill off or imprison those journalists.
- dogorman 5y agoThey're doing that too... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Jamal_Khashoggi https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assassination_of_Jamal_Khashog... These firms are helping authoritarian regimes kill and imprison journalists. The journalists who survive by being paranoid will be made less effective by having to use less effective methods of communication, which likely aren't understood by the people journalists talk to (whistleblowers, witnesses, etc.)
- dillondoyle 5y agoThe articles show that his wife (or whoever was his partner idk status) was hacked around the time of his murder. Also reports Mexican journalist was hacked, then executed right after at an obscure location. Heavily implies GPS tracking was used for the hit.
- buran77 5y agoOld-school techniques were hard to pull off even by trained spies with a proper (and vast) support network, let alone by journalists and John Rando who have never met. If you're on a watch list that gets your phone flagged for malware then it's not a stretch to assume that you can also be physically watched. And meeting in person with journalists or sources while being under surveillance is like painting a target on your back. And that's before considering that a journalist would never have a realistic chance to meet potential sources under repressive regimes on the other side of the world, certainly not a useful number. Computers and encryption made this kind of covert communication far more accessible to the laymen. Anything that sets that back just deters people from even trying and this is exactly the chilling effect those oppressive regimes are looking for.
- pmoriarty 5y ago"If you're on a watch list that gets your phone flagged for malware then it's not a stretch to assume that you can also be physically watched." The difference is you need way more resources and funds to physically watch and search a lot of people than to spy on their computer communications or hack in to their phones/laptops. Mass computer surveillance is practical, easy, and affordable.. mass physical surveillance is much harder, much more expensive, and impractical to do effectively on large populations.
- buran77 5y ago> you need way more resources and funds to physically watch and search a lot of people [...] Mass computer surveillance is practical, easy, and affordable You're right but old-school methods make everything impractical, hard, expensive, and far riskier for both the dissident who already has enough reasons to just stay quiet, and also for the journalist. They set a very high bar for succeeding. You're asking a regular person to take the end-to-end role of a Cold War spy and their source. And this when having access to sensitive info, suspicious purchases like photographic equipment and chemicals, trips abroad, or any attempt to contact a journalist would individually be enough to put someone on a watch list. There are only so many ways to get in contact with a journalist and set up meetings that don't involve any electronic communication. The state can take a lot more than the individual. So the question is how many people who have sensitive information to share could or would go that route in face of this dramatically mounting pressure? Anything that raises that bar for doing it is a win for the oppressive regime because it makes surveillance that much easier.
- IfOnlyYouKnew 5y agoJournalism is already a profession running on fumes (literally, in the past. More metaphorically, today). It's just not feasible to do without technology. People sometimes seem to imagine some world inhibited by security-conscious professions that is more akin to a slick movie than real life. Witness the common believe that, say, blocking websites at DNS levels has zero impact on crime because it's easy to circumvent. Real-life criminals, journalists, or activists prefer Telegram over code tattooed on a messenger's scalp for the same reason we all do: hair grows too slow and nobody is getting on international flights right now. I know it's fun to imagine all these activities involving "threat actors" and steganographic key exchanges via Pornhub (Alex and Bob getting on?). But that road leads to busywork that doesn't get any corrupt politician's name on that white page.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 5y agoI think if you sell an exploit and it's used in a crime you should be held accountable as if you sold a weapon to an enemy.
- slg 5y agoWould you want people who develop encryption algorithms held accountable if those algorithms are used to hide illegal activities?
- DangitBobby 5y agoWe can pick and choose.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 5y agoNo
- slg 5y agoHow is it different? They are tools that can be used for both legal and illegal means. If you put legal responsibility on one toolmaker to ensure their tools are not used in an illegal fashion, why wouldn't you do the same for other toolmakers?
- zatertip 5y agoIsn't that obvious? An exploit is to encryption as a sword is to a shield. We don't regulate shields.
- slg 5y agoA shield can inflict damage just like a sword can. Encryption hiding the details of a murder plot can be just as crucial as an exploit that reveals a murder target's location.
- 5y ago