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That's right. Things that we agree on being named the same we call 'real'. Imagine this, say what everyone perceives as the color red I perceive it as what eve
by srean 5y ago
That's right. Things that we agree on being named the same we call 'real'.
Imagine this, say what everyone perceives as the color red I perceive it as what everyone else perceives as yellow. But since I have been taught the name of the colors by these people, I will end up matching the names of the colors although I am perceiving something very different.
This needs to be considered in debates on whether animals have consciousness, do they have an "I". The dominant popular belief is that they aren't. My question is, devoid of a common communication language how would you find out. Only thing we have is their observable external behavior. If that is consistent with the 'consciousness' hypothesis, then that's all we can say. In that case we have about as much evidence of presence of consciousness that a fellow human incapable of communicating with us in language as much as another animal say a dolphin. In both the cases its a hypothesis that explains externally observable behavior.
Till we find a way to listen into one's internal monologue this is pretty much all we can do.
I like Feynman's example of the 'inside of a brick' no one has seen that with an unaided human eye. Before other forms of sensing the 'inside' came along (X-ray, ultrasound, ...) it was just a hypothesis that fit observable experience. No one would have actually seen the inside of a brick. When you break it open, its no longer the 'inside'. That there is no 'inside' and that a new surface is formed by the be the act of breaking the brick could have been a plausible alternative hypothesis. Existence of an 'inside' is just a simpler hypothesis.
- BoiledCabbage 5y ago> Only thing we have is their observable external behavior. If that is consistent with the 'consciousness' hypothesis, then that's all we can say. In that case we have about as much evidence of presence of consciousness that a fellow human ... It's been mind boggling to me for years that this isn't the default accepted position. That most intelligent life (ie animals) are conscious just like us. Look at what dogs, cats, monkeys do. In what possible way can you say they aren't conscious but another person you can't speak with is? Based on what evidence? The fact we try and reserve consciousness for humans is the most "epi-cycles in support of geocentrism" thing I've ever seen in science. It's silly. It's wholly unscientific, in fact it's anti-science as it actively avoids the most scientific explanation to reach a conclusion that "we're special". Its flawed and a stain on science.
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- amanaplanacanal 5y agoI'm a little confused here. Is it the accepted scientific dogma somewhere that other mammals aren't conscious?
- fighterpilot 5y ago> say what everyone perceives as the color red I perceive it as what everyone else perceives as yellow. This is part of the "knowledge argument": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_argument
- srean 5y agoThe philosophers Hobbes and Calvin do not disappoint https://i.redd.it/h2pt1xw3d9801.jpg https://i.redd.it/h2pt1xw3d9801.jpg
- galaxyLogic 5y agoIt doesn't matter how one person perceives "red". What matter is they can consistently agree with other about what things are red what not. It is a bit like a web-page with many dom-elements on it, each having its own id. The id is like our perceptions. The id is arbitrary but what matters is that the same id always refers to the same dom-element. I mean I don't even know what I perceive when I perceive red. I just perceive and use the id "red" for it. The thing is that in our brain there is some kind of an id associated with our experience of redness. When we experience it we say hey I recognize this experience as something familiar, so I will use the same id 'red' to describe it as I have before.