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Not quite: under typical Ethereum chain conditions, you can include a small constant-sized priority fee to encourage miners to include your transaction. (This i

Not quite: under typical Ethereum chain conditions, you can include a small constant-sized priority fee to encourage miners to include your transaction. (This is really simple, and can be a default which most users are never even aware of.) This priority fee is free money for the miner; the only reason they would not include your tx is because it would make their block slightly larger, which would make it propagate over the network slightly more slowly, and slightly increases the chance that the race is won by a different miner who discovered a block nearly simultaneously. So, the priority fee just needs to be big enough to make up for this tiny extra risk.

tobltobs 5y ago
High gas prices are often caused by bidding wars between front-running bots. This upgrade will not stop this dynamic.
- T0Bi 5y ago
  This is already a thing of the past past as those bots now use flashbots to pay the miners which doesn't result in high fees. https://github.com/flashbots/pm https://github.com/flashbots/pm
  - jl2718 5y ago
    Interesting that, of all the many possible simple solutions to this massive problem with the protocol, they chose to ignore it in favor of something that solves… wait, what is the problem exactly that this upgrade solves?
jl2718 5y ago
No. The main reason they would reject a transaction is to raise the demand for priority fees. I will repeat: there is zero incentive to include a zero-fee transaction. In fact, the incentive is negative for two reasons. Firstly because it helps the miners to set a price floor. Secondly, because the empty blocks reduce the burn fee, which opens up more of the demand elasticity to be captured by the priority fee. I know there are all these armchair geniuses like Vlad and Roughgarden that are convinced it will work out a certain way. Sorry, but they don’t know squat until there’s real money on the line. You can almost guarantee that zero-fee txs will be ignored, and the bigger the pools get, the more they can collude to set a price floor. So please tell me again how this is any different at all from the current fee structure in the miner perspective.

tobltobs 5y ago

High gas prices are often caused by bidding wars between front-running bots. This upgrade will not stop this dynamic.

T0Bi 5y ago
This is already a thing of the past past as those bots now use flashbots to pay the miners which doesn't result in high fees. https://github.com/flashbots/pm https://github.com/flashbots/pm
- jl2718 5y ago
  Interesting that, of all the many possible simple solutions to this massive problem with the protocol, they chose to ignore it in favor of something that solves… wait, what is the problem exactly that this upgrade solves?

jl2718 5y ago

No. The main reason they would reject a transaction is to raise the demand for priority fees. I will repeat: there is zero incentive to include a zero-fee transaction. In fact, the incentive is negative for two reasons. Firstly because it helps the miners to set a price floor. Secondly, because the empty blocks reduce the burn fee, which opens up more of the demand elasticity to be captured by the priority fee. I know there are all these armchair geniuses like Vlad and Roughgarden that are convinced it will work out a certain way. Sorry, but they don’t know squat until there’s real money on the line. You can almost guarantee that zero-fee txs will be ignored, and the bigger the pools get, the more they can collude to set a price floor. So please tell me again how this is any different at all from the current fee structure in the miner perspective.