5 ms·
Dropping down to Peano Arithmetic for a moment. We can consider adding a new constant 'c' for a natural number to the language along with the following infinit
by rssoconnor 5y ago
Dropping down to Peano Arithmetic for a moment. We can consider adding a new constant 'c' for a natural number to the language along with the following infinite list of axioms about this remarkable constant:
- 0 < c
- 1 < c
- 2 < c
- 3 < c
...
Adding all these axioms is consistent. I.e. you can do induction upto 'c', whatever it is. Why is it consistent? Because if there was a contradiction, the proof of such a contradiction would be finite, and hence can only use a finite number of these new axioms (this is a so-call compactness argument). But clearly any finite subset of this list of axioms is consistent because it has a model where c is just defined to be 1 more than the largest numeral appearing in that list.
But all those infinite number of axioms taken together creates an unsound system because it claims that 'c' denotes a natural number that is larger than every written numeral.
Heading back to ZFC land, it turns out that (assuming ¬Con(ZFC) is independent of ZFC) adding ¬Con(ZFC) to ZFC similarly is similarly unsound in that it yields only models that have elements that are larger than every written numeral.
- skissane 5y ago> in that it yields only models that have elements that are larger than every written numeral. Are these like hyperintegers (or should I say hypernaturals), as in the hyperrreal numbers used in non-standard analysis?
- im3w1l 5y agoThis sounds a little bit like an argument against systems with an infinite number of axioms to me. Or maybe it's fine but only under certain conditions?