5 ms·
> Do I want Firefox to have access to my Contacts? My Photos? Do I want Facebook to have that access? To all of them, or just ones that I select? Should my disk
by heavyset_go 5y ago
> Do I want Firefox to have access to my Contacts? My Photos? Do I want Facebook to have that access? To all of them, or just ones that I select? Should my disk utility have the ability to send data over the network? My IDE? My IDE plugins?
Modern security on Linux is hardly dependent on the POSIX security model.
Linux just got the Landlock feature[1] in the kernel[2] that does just this. Along with Landlock, features like cgroups, seccomp, AppArmor, Firejail and other sandboxing features go far beyond the traditional POSIX security model. Even parts of the ChromeOS security model are based on modern Linux sandboxing features, and don't rely on POSIX security.
To address your Firefox example, I use these features to sandbox Firefox so that it runs in a container, and limit its ability to run code or make certain syscalls, and it's only allowed to touch its profile and a dedicated Downloads folder. D-Bus can't even reach it.
> This has nothing to do with "stores"
I didn't say anything about stores. It has everything to do with Apple, Microsoft and (slowly) Google forgoing OS-level security for centralized control of what can and cannot run on their operating systems. This is not just enforced with "stores", but with certificate systems like Apple's Notarization and Gatekeeper programs and Microsoft's certificate program.
Instead of relying on the system to provide security, we're relying on Apple, Google and Microsoft to decide what we can run, or can't run, even though Apple is responsible for distributing 500 million copies of Xcodeghost[3], and Google's Play Store is the #1 vector for malware on Android[4].
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/703876/ https://lwn.net/Articles/703876/
[2] https://lwn.net/Articles/700607/ https://lwn.net/Articles/700607/
[3] https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bbmz/the-fortnite-trial-is-exposing-details-about-the-biggest-iphone-hack-of-all-time https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bbmz/the-fortnite-trial-is...
[4] https://www.zdnet.com/article/play-store-identified-as-main-distribution-vector-for-most-android-malware/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/play-store-identified-as-main-...
- jolux 5y ago> Instead of relying on the system to provide security, we're relying on Apple, Google and Microsoft to decide what we can run, or can't run This is highly misleading. System-level hardening is complementary to cryptographic trust, not a replacement forit. Hardening features do their best to prevent arbitrary malicious processes from controlling the system, and the certificate systems make it possible to revoke the ability of specific known-malicious authors to distribute software. In macOS, you can look at the entitlements system, sandboxing, and system integrity protection for examples of hardening. Not to mention, at least on macOS and Windows, all the certificate verification features can be turned off.
- heavyset_go 5y ago> System-level hardening is complementary to cryptographic trust, not a replacement forit. Hardening features do their best to prevent arbitrary malicious processes from controlling the system, and the certificate systems make it possible to revoke the ability of specific known-malicious authors to distribute software. In macOS, you can look at the entitlements system, sandboxing, and system integrity protection for examples of hardening. I agree, however neither of these operating systems gives the user the level of control to address these concerns: > Do I want Firefox to have access to my Contacts? My Photos? Do I want Facebook to have that access? To all of them, or just ones that I select? Should my disk utility have the ability to send data over the network? My IDE? My IDE plugins? A system that implemented security that empowers users would allow you to say "I want my Email App to only access certain Contacts or certain Photos", allow you to supply dummy data to apps and give you better granularity. Instead, what we get from Google is a system whose security is convenient for advertisers first, and not users, so it doesn't offer that level of empowerment even though some AOSP forks do. You either give it all of your contacts or pictures or none of them. Making a secure system that also empowers users would mean that they and their partners can't collect user data. We're shown scary warnings about installing apps outside of the Play Store and are assured that Play Protect means that everything on the Play Store is secured. What we get from Apple is a security model that is convenient to their bottom line, so instead of addressing that user's needs, users are told they don't have to worry about their Email App doing anything bad with their contacts or photos because Apple vets apps and its developers. Like on Android, you either give the app all of your contacts or none. Making a secure system that also empowers users goes against their marketing that insists that their App Store and certificate racket are the only things keeping users private and safe.
- jolux 5y agoiOS already lets you choose with granularity which photos to allow an app access to as of iOS 14. Both macOS and iOS do not allow any app to have access to photos, contacts, camera, etc, without prompting the user first. But there is a trade off between usability and security, and Apple is pushing that boundary towards security and privacy about as aggressively as any vendor is. People have been complaining about all the new entitlements pop-ups in macOS and saying they shouldn’t exist! But they are providing real benefits to users and increased safety. Of course they should be doing more, but they are constantly improving, and the same can be said of any organization. Where are the Linux distros that do this stuff out of the box and don’t involve configuring these tools with the command line? SELinux and all of those other tools you mention aren’t helping users if users are forced to become sysadmins to benefit.
- an_opabinia 5y ago> Instead of relying on the system to provide security, we're relying on Apple, Google and Microsoft to decide what we can run, or can't run, even though Apple is responsible for distributing 500 million copies of Xcodeghost[3], and Google's Play Store is the #1 vector for malware on Android[4]. The security stuff is a huge red herring. The security model is all about limiting self publishing and directly reaching consumers by the biggest players in IP, Disney, Netflix, Nintendo and Tencent. 90% of App Store revenue is games. Most remaining revenue is to subscription entertainment services. Security as engineers talk about it basically never affects the bottom line.