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> A lot of people talk about Apple as wanting to "own" everything, but the trend in securing consumer OS environments is clearly trending in this direction. Sta
by heavyset_go 5y ago
> A lot of people talk about Apple as wanting to "own" everything, but the trend in securing consumer OS environments is clearly trending in this direction. Starting with research examples like Qubes, and all the mainstream security efforts in Windows, and ChromeOS.
This is because Google and Microsoft want to own everything, as well. It's not a coincidence that Apple, Google and Microsoft's security implementations enshrine each of them as ultimate gatekeeper and single source of truth for security on their respective operating systems.
It is interesting that you bring up Qubes OS, because its security model doesn't depend on Invisible Things Lab, the Qubes developer[1], deciding what can or can't run on Qubes OS.
In fact, if a security model that depended on a company like Red Hat authorizing what can or can't run on Linux, it would be rightly criticized as Red Hat trying to "own" everything instead of developing a secure system at the OS level. Yet Apple, Google and Microsoft are doing just that.
[1] https://invisiblethingslab.com/ https://invisiblethingslab.com/
- numbsafari 5y agoI think we are really conflating "app store distribution" and "the POSIX userland isn't workable in a modern security environment for end-users". POSIX apps run as the user, when they really need to be run with their own identity. Most often we should use the identity of the "developer". Do I want Firefox to have access to my Contacts? My Photos? Do I want Facebook to have that access? To all of them, or just ones that I select? Should my disk utility have the ability to send data over the network? My IDE? My IDE plugins? This has nothing to do with "stores", and everything to do with the security model and the UI needed to make it work. e.g., when I run `grep -e "Something" -r ~/src`, I assume grep is going to read all of the files in ~/src. But in the basic POSIX environment it can access anything I can (including, say, ~/.ssh) and open up any old socket it wants and send data wherever it chooses. Have you read every line of code of every package you've installed? Rather than relying on 'trust', 2021 requires that we actually have some security model that doesn't rely on trust, but explicit permissions and grants, and workable UI for defining that. Wouldn't it be nice if bash arranged a read-only capability granted to the grep process for all files under ~/src based on the above command, and if the grep executable itself had no inherent permissions at all?
- viraptor 5y agoThat's pretty much selinux. We don't have a nice ui for it, because what you described is actually pretty complicated to achieve. But it actually works. Today.
- mikepurvis 5y agoSocket/port activation in the init system tries to be a piece of this puzzle too, though obviously it's far from the whole story.
- heavyset_go 5y ago> Do I want Firefox to have access to my Contacts? My Photos? Do I want Facebook to have that access? To all of them, or just ones that I select? Should my disk utility have the ability to send data over the network? My IDE? My IDE plugins? Modern security on Linux is hardly dependent on the POSIX security model. Linux just got the Landlock feature[1] in the kernel[2] that does just this. Along with Landlock, features like cgroups, seccomp, AppArmor, Firejail and other sandboxing features go far beyond the traditional POSIX security model. Even parts of the ChromeOS security model are based on modern Linux sandboxing features, and don't rely on POSIX security. To address your Firefox example, I use these features to sandbox Firefox so that it runs in a container, and limit its ability to run code or make certain syscalls, and it's only allowed to touch its profile and a dedicated Downloads folder. D-Bus can't even reach it. > This has nothing to do with "stores" I didn't say anything about stores. It has everything to do with Apple, Microsoft and (slowly) Google forgoing OS-level security for centralized control of what can and cannot run on their operating systems. This is not just enforced with "stores", but with certificate systems like Apple's Notarization and Gatekeeper programs and Microsoft's certificate program. Instead of relying on the system to provide security, we're relying on Apple, Google and Microsoft to decide what we can run, or can't run, even though Apple is responsible for distributing 500 million copies of Xcodeghost[3], and Google's Play Store is the #1 vector for malware on Android[4]. [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/703876/ https://lwn.net/Articles/703876/ [2] https://lwn.net/Articles/700607/ https://lwn.net/Articles/700607/ [3] https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bbmz/the-fortnite-trial-is-exposing-details-about-the-biggest-iphone-hack-of-all-time https://www.vice.com/en/article/n7bbmz/the-fortnite-trial-is... [4] https://www.zdnet.com/article/play-store-identified-as-main-distribution-vector-for-most-android-malware/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/play-store-identified-as-main-...
- chrisfinazzo 5y ago> This is because Google and Microsoft want to own everything, as well. It's not a coincidence that Apple, Google and Microsoft's security implementations enshrine each of them as ultimate gatekeeper and single source of truth for security on their respective operating systems. To a close approximation, 99% of regular users (let's just say people who are not developers by profession) do implicitly trust their respective OS vendors. To suggest otherwise suggests a level of paranoia which would make it impossible to ever have a stable system and get anything done.
- numbsafari 5y agoIt's funny, because I actually agree with both of you. We should generally trust our primary OS vendor, because otherwise we're all going to need therapy. But we shouldn't have to trust them. That is, the system should be designed such that we have some amount of "defense in depth" where a mistake by Apple during the review of one of the 3.5 million apps doesn't result in an exploit. I think this is why Apple and the others are trending towards the design that they are, because a deep capability approach that's integrated into the UI helps offload some of the complexity and overhead of managing that liability at scale.
- saagarjha 5y ago> I think this is why Apple and the others are trending towards the design that they are, because a deep capability approach that's integrated into the UI helps offload some of the complexity and overhead of managing that liability at scale. I don't think this is an accurate description of what Apple is doing at all. If anything, they're moving more towards the direction where they are implicitly trusted and if you don't trust them you don't get any security.
- kaba0 5y agoApple does have pretty great security story. On ios, it’s like state of the art, and it’s ok on macos as well. And no, walled garden is not the security of apple, but proper sandboxing is. So even without extensive app review (which is frankly, not extensive at all) a rouge application should not be able to do much damage.
- babypuncher 5y ago> Apple, Google and Microsoft's security implementations enshrine each of them as ultimate gatekeeper and single source of truth for security on their respective operating systems. Who do you propose should shoulder this responsibility? The vast majority of users lack the expertise to take it on themselves.
- atoav 5y agoIn my eyes the whole philosophy is wrong. They (we?) try to add abstractions and systems on top that catches code that abuses flaws in systems and software. How about using the same energy to create systems and software that are more rugged, reliable and won't fall apart when a three year old mashes the buttons long enough? Or have we already given up?
- kaba0 5y agoSecurity is orthogonal to good code. Especially when you run untrusted code on your computer regardless of its quality.
- heavyset_go 5y agoWhile I don't think it's perfect, and I don't use it myself, but because it was mentioned in the GP comment I responded to, we can look at the security model of Qubes OS which doesn't rely on its developer to decide what can and can't run on the OS. Ideally, systems would be designed such that risks are minimized no matter where the app you want to run came from and no matter who signed it. Right now, that's how Apple, Google and Microsoft are dealing with security. They rely on developers signing software with certificates, and they revoke those certificates if they don't want that software to run on their operating systems. There was an incident last year the highlighted this system[1]: > Last week, just after we covered the release of Big Sur, many macOS users around the world experienced something unprecedented on the platform: a widespread outage of an obscure Apple service caused users worldwide to be unable to launch 3rd party applications. Already being dubbed the “Apple Apocalypse” or “OCSP Apocalypse”, the cause was down to a little-known but essential service called “Online Certificate Status Protocol” > The purpose of the OCSP call is to check whether a piece of software being launched has had its developer certificate revoked. Revoking developer certificates is one way that Apple deal with known malware. By using an OCSP responder service, Apple hope to prevent any software whose certificate has been revoked from launching on pretty much all Macs anywhere within minutes. [1] https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/what-happened-to-my-mac-apples-ocsp-apocalypse/ https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/what-happened-to-my-mac-app...