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If you have redundant AOA sensors on a plane and they disagree what do you do? Alert the pilot. You have to do the same on a self-driving car as well. You can't
by flowerlad 5y ago
If you have redundant AOA sensors on a plane and they disagree what do you do? Alert the pilot. You have to do the same on a self-driving car as well. You can't just ignore a serious malfunction, or pretend to not see it just because you don't know to handle it!
To be truly redundant you have to use different technologies, such as camera and lidar.
- brianwawok 5y ago> If you have redundant AOA sensors on a plane and they disagree what do you do? Alert the pilot. Right, which means it's not a solution for L4/L5 autonomy, only for L2. Tesla is trying to reach L4/L5, so just alerting the pilot is not satisfying the design goal. > To be truly redundant you have to use different technologies, such as camera and lidar. I think that is an opinion and not a fact. Watch a video such as https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOL_rCK59ZI&t=28286s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOL_rCK59ZI&t=28286s from someone working on this problem
- flowerlad 5y ago> Tesla is trying to reach L4/L5, so just alerting the pilot is not satisfying the design goal. Neither is ignoring it. If a product can't meet the design goals under certain circumstances should it ignore it, not even look for it, or alert the user that there is a catastrophic failure? > I think that is an opinion and not a fact. I think it is more common sense than anything else.
- thatguy0900 5y agoHow about they reach lvl 4/5 performance and then they can turn off the lidar then. Because right now, the car is steering into plain view obstacles. That's what they need to worry about, not whether stopping the crashes now goes against their lvl 4 philosophy.
- bumby 5y ago>To be truly redundant you have to use different technologies, such as camera and lidar. This isn't necessarily true. From a reliability engineering perspective it depends on the modes of failure and the probability of each mode. If the probability of an AOA failure is low enough, you can reach your designed risk level by having two identical and redundant components. It all comes down the level of acceptable risk.