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> Haven’t we observed complex human-like emotions for elephants, dolphins, and various other primates (eg grieving rituals for lost family members)? I think we

> Haven’t we observed complex human-like emotions for elephants, dolphins, and various other primates (eg grieving rituals for lost family members)? I think we observe complex behavior that we associate with our own emotional experiences (which seem appropriate given our genetic / biological / physiological similarities), I just doubt they're necessarily as intense as we experience them given our ability to reflect on them. And if you can't reflect on an emotion, can you even necessarily be conscious of it at all? It seems more likely to me that animals experience no conscious awareness of their own emotions at all, however complex they may be.

EamonnMR 5y ago
Could the fear I feel when I see an oncoming bus really be so different than the fear a squirrel feels when I make a sudden move towards it?
- shannifin 5y ago
  Of course it could. What is the difference between the fear felt from an oncoming bus vs flinching at someone popping out and saying "boo"? It's our ability to think about the meaningfulness of the stimulus. We know the bus could kill us (or at least deliver tremendous pain), whereas the scare from a prank is just a sort of autoresponse from our sympathetic nervous system; we jump before we're even conscious as to why our body is reacting. (We may even enjoy the autoresponse and purposefully seek out jump scares.) So, for a squirrel, perhaps it's like our unconscious sympathetic nervous system autoresponse, but all the time.
  - foxes 5y ago
    I definitely think dogs, for example, have the capacity to reflect on it to a extent. You can play games with dogs, they seek it out. I believe there is evidence they can plan. I think they can observe you and then adjust themselves accordingly. If you are angry they can be sad or cautious. If you look sad they can comfort. But they also seem to possess their own independent moods. Planning and adapting to stimulus seems like consciousness to me. I think in Humans language can actually be a big component of that feedback, you can structure your thoughts and reason with it. An internal dialogue. But I am not sure it is entirely necessary.
srean 5y ago
I think we observe complex behavior in you personally that we associate with our own ... I just doubt they are necessarily as intense as we experience. Lets start using the same standards of 'proof' If Helen Keller were never to learn to communicate with us through language that we understand are we to have believed that she has no consciousness -- just external manifestation that "complex behavior that we associate with our own emotional experience ..."
- shannifin 5y ago
  > If Helen Keller were never to learn to communicate with us through language that we understand are we to have believed that she has no consciousness. I was only referring to emotions and their intensity in species that exhibit no ability to self-reflect, not consciousness in general.
  - srean 5y ago
    I am doing the same. I am just pointing out that we use different standards of 'proof'. The only way I can assign an internal monologue of human emotions to you is (i) pattern match your external behavior with my own behavior in an emotional state (ii) take you on your word when you describe that your feelings, (iii) assume that all humans are roughly going to be the same. With animals (ii) is not an option. It would not have been an option for Helen Keller too before a common language was established. Regarding (iii) it depends on where we draw the line where similarity ends, one can argue that there is a lot of shared physiology among say dolphins, us, elephants, primates dogs … So believing that animals do not have internal monologue of emotions when they clearly show similar external manifestation is sourced more from human exceptionalism and having double standards for proofs. We don't have the technology yet to listen into the internal monologues of anybody other than our own. All we have is evidence of external behavior and some physiological telemetry. What we conclude from these stems from what we want to believe. We have been wrong about our exceptionalism many times in history, so its not a very reliable guide. By the way when I use the word 'you' its to draw attention to epistemological problem in the line of argument. Not that I disbelieve that you do have emotions.

EamonnMR 5y ago

Could the fear I feel when I see an oncoming bus really be so different than the fear a squirrel feels when I make a sudden move towards it?

shannifin 5y ago
Of course it could. What is the difference between the fear felt from an oncoming bus vs flinching at someone popping out and saying "boo"? It's our ability to think about the meaningfulness of the stimulus. We know the bus could kill us (or at least deliver tremendous pain), whereas the scare from a prank is just a sort of autoresponse from our sympathetic nervous system; we jump before we're even conscious as to why our body is reacting. (We may even enjoy the autoresponse and purposefully seek out jump scares.) So, for a squirrel, perhaps it's like our unconscious sympathetic nervous system autoresponse, but all the time.
- foxes 5y ago
  I definitely think dogs, for example, have the capacity to reflect on it to a extent. You can play games with dogs, they seek it out. I believe there is evidence they can plan. I think they can observe you and then adjust themselves accordingly. If you are angry they can be sad or cautious. If you look sad they can comfort. But they also seem to possess their own independent moods. Planning and adapting to stimulus seems like consciousness to me. I think in Humans language can actually be a big component of that feedback, you can structure your thoughts and reason with it. An internal dialogue. But I am not sure it is entirely necessary.

srean 5y ago

I think we observe complex behavior in you personally that we associate with our own ... I just doubt they are necessarily as intense as we experience. Lets start using the same standards of 'proof' If Helen Keller were never to learn to communicate with us through language that we understand are we to have believed that she has no consciousness -- just external manifestation that "complex behavior that we associate with our own emotional experience ..."

shannifin 5y ago
> If Helen Keller were never to learn to communicate with us through language that we understand are we to have believed that she has no consciousness. I was only referring to emotions and their intensity in species that exhibit no ability to self-reflect, not consciousness in general.
- srean 5y ago
  I am doing the same. I am just pointing out that we use different standards of 'proof'. The only way I can assign an internal monologue of human emotions to you is (i) pattern match your external behavior with my own behavior in an emotional state (ii) take you on your word when you describe that your feelings, (iii) assume that all humans are roughly going to be the same. With animals (ii) is not an option. It would not have been an option for Helen Keller too before a common language was established. Regarding (iii) it depends on where we draw the line where similarity ends, one can argue that there is a lot of shared physiology among say dolphins, us, elephants, primates dogs … So believing that animals do not have internal monologue of emotions when they clearly show similar external manifestation is sourced more from human exceptionalism and having double standards for proofs. We don't have the technology yet to listen into the internal monologues of anybody other than our own. All we have is evidence of external behavior and some physiological telemetry. What we conclude from these stems from what we want to believe. We have been wrong about our exceptionalism many times in history, so its not a very reliable guide. By the way when I use the word 'you' its to draw attention to epistemological problem in the line of argument. Not that I disbelieve that you do have emotions.