Ordinal preferences are fundamentally wrong, because they arbitrarily assign equal weight to preferences that are not equal. For example, if I am indifferent b

Ordinal preferences are fundamentally wrong, because they arbitrarily assign equal weight to preferences that are not equal. For example, if I am indifferent between two candidates, and a ranked voting system forces me to choose one over the other (randomly), while you love one and hate the other, it is undemocratic for my weak preference to have the same weight as your strong preference. Such a system is less likely to find the most representative candidate than one which takes that strength of preference into account. > Again, the fundamental problem with cardinal voting is simply that there's no intuitive, easily agreed-upon meaning for what cardinal values even mean. Cardinal values are perfectly meaningful. They can be interpreted as expressions of ordinal preference for probabilities of different outcomes, for instance. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Morgenstern_utility_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann%E2%80%93Morgenster... For example, if I prefer Strawberry ice cream over Chocolate ice cream, and Chocolate ice cream over Garlic ice cream, and am given the choice between: - A box that definitely contains Chocolate - A box that has a 50/50 chance of containing Strawberry or Garlic I would choose the safe bet of Chocolate, because my preference for C>G is much stronger than my preference for S>C. By varying the probability and making the choice again, we can estimate the ratio of the strengths of my preferences between the three options.