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> If Mozilla cared about preventing DNS tampering, they could have done DNSSEC 10 years ago. DNSSEC only protects integrity, not confidentiality or availabilit
by josephcsible 5y ago
> If Mozilla cared about preventing DNS tampering, they could have done DNSSEC 10 years ago.
DNSSEC only protects integrity, not confidentiality or availability. It still lets evil ISPs build a profile of every domain you've ever resolved, and to block your access to certain domains by just dropping your DNS request packets for them. Basically the only thing it stops is them sending you to a fake page (e.g., a pretty block message rather than a generic browser error).
- SilverRed 5y agoAlso no one cares about integrity since it is already validated by TLS. And it seems that DNSSEC is not even widely supported by TLDs. My domain says DNSSEC is not available. Seems like DNSSEC is another failed spec like certificate pinning.
- josephcsible 5y agoWe need DNSSEC for eSNI/ECH to be possible.
- tptacek 5y agoThe eSNI drafts I read say explicitly that DNSSEC is not required (there's a whole section about it), which is good, because if it were, eSNI would be dead in the water.
- josephcsible 5y agoI looked again and you're correct. For other readers, the justification is basically that if an attacker can MITM DNS, then they can find out what domains you're going to even without compromising eSNI/ECH.
- tptacek 5y agoI double checked the RFCs, but I'm not kidding that you can generally work this stuff out axiomatically (for a change) --- if an important new standard requires DNSSEC, it's not an important new standard, because it can't happen. DNSSEC is moribund.