4 ms·
>Couldn’t they introduce the same security feature mentioned for symlinks? "The tmpfiles.d specification for the Z type more or less implies some kind of recur
by tyingq 5y ago
>Couldn’t they introduce the same security feature mentioned for symlinks?
"The tmpfiles.d specification for the Z type more or less implies some kind of recursive chown. The spec heads off one type of vulnerability by saying that symlinks should not be followed; however, hard links are still a problem"
https://github.com/OpenRC/opentmpfiles/issues/3 https://github.com/OpenRC/opentmpfiles/issues/3
>As in, make it so by default you can’t create a hard link to a file you don’t already have write access to?
From the CVE: "when the fs.protected_hardlinks sysctl is turned off"
A description of that: "When set to “1” hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it."
- gunapologist99 5y agoFrom the linked article, "If you're not using systemd, the vanilla Linux kernel does not enable these protections by default" ... which just seems a bit discriminatory.
- tyingq 5y agoTorvalds did weigh in on it. It's disabled by default because it apparently breaks some legacy stuff. https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/561ec64ae67ef25cac8d72bb9c4bfc955edfd415 https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/561ec64ae67ef25cac8...
- gunapologist99 5y ago.. which apparently now won't work under systemd either! IMO, he was wrong on this; it should have been enabled by default, and then the people who need that exceptionally rare legacy stuff can disable it with the same techniques (/proc, initrd) that he is currently suggesting to enable it.