The interesting part about last year's incidents of solarwinds, fireeye and fortinet is that there's a switch away from actually targeting the hosts after the f

The interesting part about last year's incidents of solarwinds, fireeye and fortinet is that there's a switch away from actually targeting the hosts after the first line of defense. Redteams / hackers now target the infastructure, because it's way easier and they're more outdated in regards of code, stability and used libraries. Most enterprise-grade VPN solutions still use OpenSSL from decades ago, and most of their fixes (even if they react to CVEs) are always too late. As SOCs need VPN access because they are usually not on-site, especially at larger corporations...the result is when you exploit the VPN gateway, you are the new administrator because you have a large time window until the SOC team arrives on-site. These couple hours are usually everything you need as a time window to raid the place, install and run ransomware, and clean up afterwards. From a cybersec perspective I cannot even begin to write how stupid it is to put literally all your company's value in the hands of a single security company - which is legally not responsible for anything by contract. Security through obscurity never worked, why should it do in this case? Last year showed that we desperately need an open source OpenVPN based graphical and scalable alternative that uses a standard TOTP based token generation mechanism and not some proprietary crap for authentication.