3 ms·
It's easy enough to apply outside audits to something like Space Shuttle development, where the goals are not secret and it's pretty well understood what you ar
by AndrewBissell 5y ago
It's easy enough to apply outside audits to something like Space Shuttle development, where the goals are not secret and it's pretty well understood what you are trying to accomplish and what your capabilities are. It's a very different situation when it comes to bioweapons research -- how do you let outside auditors into Fort Detrick without running the risk of giving some game away?
- michaelmrose 5y agoNeither we nor China are supposed to be doing bioweapons research in part because all examples thus far are impossible to target and destroy women, children, and civilians indescriminately far too slowly to prevent retaliation with swifter means of dealing death. If anyone is researching this I support their change of address to prison.
- rossdavidh 5y agoWhile it is certainly true that outside auditors (with enforcement authority) would never be allowed into a bioweapons lab of either China or the USA, it also doesn't really seem to be the case that the virology lab in Wuhan was a bioweapons lab. Most labs doing this kind of research are not bioweapons labs. Moreover, due to the national security implications, bioweapons labs tend at least to have good security about letting stuff out, if for the wrong reasons. If we had outside auditing of all non-bioweapons labs doing this kind of research, it would still greatly reduce the collective risk, if only because that would be most of the labs.