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Much of the article reminds me of the description of how NASA ended up launching a shuttle in temperatures far below what they originally would have allowed. Y

Much of the article reminds me of the description of how NASA ended up launching a shuttle in temperatures far below what they originally would have allowed. You walk just past the line, nothing bad happens, so you move the line a bit. You walk just past that line, nothing bad happens...and this repeats until, inevitably, eventually, something bad happens. Regardless of whether or not this pandemic came from this lab, the industry incentives described in the article can only eventually result in one. We have a mechanism for dealing with this sort of problem, and it involves outside audits. The "bad thing" involves being slapped down by an outside authority that has teeth behind its recommendations. In order to have authority in places like China, it would also need to have authority in places like the USA, which means a bunch of American (and European) scientists would see their own work get more difficult, as well. This has to make it more difficult for them to decide to think objectively about the possibility that this pandemic came from a lab.

AndrewBissell 5y ago
It's easy enough to apply outside audits to something like Space Shuttle development, where the goals are not secret and it's pretty well understood what you are trying to accomplish and what your capabilities are. It's a very different situation when it comes to bioweapons research -- how do you let outside auditors into Fort Detrick without running the risk of giving some game away?
- michaelmrose 5y ago
  Neither we nor China are supposed to be doing bioweapons research in part because all examples thus far are impossible to target and destroy women, children, and civilians indescriminately far too slowly to prevent retaliation with swifter means of dealing death. If anyone is researching this I support their change of address to prison.
- rossdavidh 5y ago
  While it is certainly true that outside auditors (with enforcement authority) would never be allowed into a bioweapons lab of either China or the USA, it also doesn't really seem to be the case that the virology lab in Wuhan was a bioweapons lab. Most labs doing this kind of research are not bioweapons labs. Moreover, due to the national security implications, bioweapons labs tend at least to have good security about letting stuff out, if for the wrong reasons. If we had outside auditing of all non-bioweapons labs doing this kind of research, it would still greatly reduce the collective risk, if only because that would be most of the labs.
jdavis703 5y ago
This sort of work should absolutely get more difficult for western scientists too. We’ve had several lab leaks that through luck didn’t turn in to pandemics. Certainly the costs of auditing and complying with lab safety is far cheaper than a global pandemic.
- raphlinus 5y ago
  Prominent, respected virologists have been questioning gain of function research for a while. Here's a cite[1] from 2018 from Marc Lipsitch, who would be on most people's top ten list of trusted virologists on Covid. He's also one of the signatories of the letter calling for investigation[2]. I think it's possible to split out the question of bioresearch risks from Covid origins. If it was a lab leak, obviously we should regulate those risks better, but we should also do more to mitigate zoonotic spillover, because we have tons of evidence that happens and causes damage. If it wasn't lab leak, we should do more to mitigate spillover, but it would also be a good idea to be more careful about biosafety. [1]: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7119956/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7119956/ [2]: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1 https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1
  - wombatmobile 5y ago
    > Prominent, respected virologists have been questioning gain of function research for a while The quotation you cite from Lipitsch doesn't validate your comment. He wasn't "questioning gain of function research". He was calling for greater oversight over gain of function research and for more initiatives to try to limit the damage potential of zoonotic spillover. If anything, Lipitsch was upholding the value of gain of function research, because he believes scientists should do everything possible to try to prevent pandemics.
    - raphlinus 5y ago
      Huh? The title of the piece is "Why Do Exceptionally Dangerous Gain-of-Function Experiments in Influenza?" The introduction specifically criticizes entire categories of GoF research, stating that it goes against the consensus view of many virologists. How is that not "questioning?" Lipsitch has been consistently critical in other fora too, including a quote in a Science piece[1], a call for a debate[2], and other communications. Now, one thing that is going on in a lot of the discussion (and which makes reasoned discourse harder) is that many people mean different things when talking about "gain of function." For some, it's anything that creates a pathogen that's potentially infectious to humans, which potentially covers a lot of experiments to test transmissibility and other factors. For others, it has to be specifically engineering to increase transmissibility or virulence [3]. That can lead to confusion, for example the debate about whether Fauci's denial that the NIAID funded GoF research was honest. I very carefully check my sources when posting, but am sure I make mistakes. When I do, I'm happy to be corrected. But this seems a very odd thing to call me out for. [1]: https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/02/exclusive-controversial-experiments-make-bird-flu-more-risky-poised-resume https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/02/exclusive-controvers... [2]: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269283247_Gain-of-function_experiments_Time_for_a_real_debate https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269283247_Gain-of-f... [3]: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4996883/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4996883/
lamontcg 5y ago
Much of this reminds me of how we went to war against Iraq The lead author of the WSJ piece on the "sick lab workers" is the same author that helped get us into Iraq with a NYT article on Hussein's nuclear WMD program in 2002.
- andreilys 5y ago
  It’s almost like those two pieces are completely unrelated to one another. If you’re looking for someone with a clean record commenting on the viability of the lab leak theory for months, take a look at Bret Weinstein.
  - amazingman 5y ago
    I took a look at Bret Weinstein, and it wasn’t good. Not good at all. He seemed to be making every effort he could to blame the mRNA vaccines for problems that —if true— could have any number of mundane explanations. But hey, maybe he’s right about the lab leak theory.
    - Wolfenstein98k 5y ago
      Yeah sadly he's gone off the deep end on "spike protein", but he has been a good fount on the origins of covid.
      - bavell 5y ago
        I'm curious what makes you think he's "gone off the deep end"?
        gameswithgo 5y ago
        bret and his brother eric have made a name for themselves as contrarians. right or wrong they will take a hot take on whatever hot topic is available and do the podcast and tweet tour with it, all the while screaming to their millions of listeners how they are being silenced.
iratewizard 5y ago
I have trouble imagining what an external auditor established in China would look like. A worldwide rating similar to credit ratings, where failing to play the game correctly results in sanctions? If China's IP history has shown us anything, it's that they will do whatever they want with reckless abandon.
- jdavis703 5y ago
  It could look something like nuclear inspectors. Every country in an arms control treaty gets to send their inspectors in to verify adherence to the agreement.
y04nn 5y ago
I like the term "normalization of deviance" and would recommand the Mike Mullane's talk on the Challenger disaster [1]. [1]: https://youtu.be/Ljzj9Msli5o https://youtu.be/Ljzj9Msli5o
pyuser583 5y ago
Does NASA have outside auditors with a highly adversarial relationship reviewing its launch procedures? I don’t think it does. I’m pretty sure NASA has an excellent internal team of quality control specialists. The specialists are a part of all aspects of deployment and launch. They don’t just pop in and review work, they’re constantly there. They’re also very much “part of the team.” They don’t strictly speaking “have teeth.” They’re focused on the same mission everyone else is, only with a special focus on making it happen safely. Maybe you mean something like the relationship between the FAA and airline industry. But that’s very different from how NASA operates. So it’s clearly not the only model.
- aj3 5y ago
  The whole saga with the outside oversight is also a complete red herring. USA would never sign a treaty that required them to show their own facilities. Case in point: biological weapons convention. A few years back there was a very popular proposal to add “teeth”, i.e. random inspections and stuff. Guess who bailed out and passed a Hague invasion act instead? EDIT: grammar

AndrewBissell 5y ago

It's easy enough to apply outside audits to something like Space Shuttle development, where the goals are not secret and it's pretty well understood what you are trying to accomplish and what your capabilities are. It's a very different situation when it comes to bioweapons research -- how do you let outside auditors into Fort Detrick without running the risk of giving some game away?

michaelmrose 5y ago
Neither we nor China are supposed to be doing bioweapons research in part because all examples thus far are impossible to target and destroy women, children, and civilians indescriminately far too slowly to prevent retaliation with swifter means of dealing death. If anyone is researching this I support their change of address to prison.
rossdavidh 5y ago
While it is certainly true that outside auditors (with enforcement authority) would never be allowed into a bioweapons lab of either China or the USA, it also doesn't really seem to be the case that the virology lab in Wuhan was a bioweapons lab. Most labs doing this kind of research are not bioweapons labs. Moreover, due to the national security implications, bioweapons labs tend at least to have good security about letting stuff out, if for the wrong reasons. If we had outside auditing of all non-bioweapons labs doing this kind of research, it would still greatly reduce the collective risk, if only because that would be most of the labs.

jdavis703 5y ago

This sort of work should absolutely get more difficult for western scientists too. We’ve had several lab leaks that through luck didn’t turn in to pandemics. Certainly the costs of auditing and complying with lab safety is far cheaper than a global pandemic.

raphlinus 5y ago
Prominent, respected virologists have been questioning gain of function research for a while. Here's a cite[1] from 2018 from Marc Lipsitch, who would be on most people's top ten list of trusted virologists on Covid. He's also one of the signatories of the letter calling for investigation[2]. I think it's possible to split out the question of bioresearch risks from Covid origins. If it was a lab leak, obviously we should regulate those risks better, but we should also do more to mitigate zoonotic spillover, because we have tons of evidence that happens and causes damage. If it wasn't lab leak, we should do more to mitigate spillover, but it would also be a good idea to be more careful about biosafety. [1]: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7119956/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7119956/ [2]: https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1 https://science.sciencemag.org/content/372/6543/694.1
- wombatmobile 5y ago
  > Prominent, respected virologists have been questioning gain of function research for a while The quotation you cite from Lipitsch doesn't validate your comment. He wasn't "questioning gain of function research". He was calling for greater oversight over gain of function research and for more initiatives to try to limit the damage potential of zoonotic spillover. If anything, Lipitsch was upholding the value of gain of function research, because he believes scientists should do everything possible to try to prevent pandemics.
  - raphlinus 5y ago
    Huh? The title of the piece is "Why Do Exceptionally Dangerous Gain-of-Function Experiments in Influenza?" The introduction specifically criticizes entire categories of GoF research, stating that it goes against the consensus view of many virologists. How is that not "questioning?" Lipsitch has been consistently critical in other fora too, including a quote in a Science piece[1], a call for a debate[2], and other communications. Now, one thing that is going on in a lot of the discussion (and which makes reasoned discourse harder) is that many people mean different things when talking about "gain of function." For some, it's anything that creates a pathogen that's potentially infectious to humans, which potentially covers a lot of experiments to test transmissibility and other factors. For others, it has to be specifically engineering to increase transmissibility or virulence [3]. That can lead to confusion, for example the debate about whether Fauci's denial that the NIAID funded GoF research was honest. I very carefully check my sources when posting, but am sure I make mistakes. When I do, I'm happy to be corrected. But this seems a very odd thing to call me out for. [1]: https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/02/exclusive-controversial-experiments-make-bird-flu-more-risky-poised-resume https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/02/exclusive-controvers... [2]: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269283247_Gain-of-function_experiments_Time_for_a_real_debate https://www.researchgate.net/publication/269283247_Gain-of-f... [3]: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4996883/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4996883/

lamontcg 5y ago

Much of this reminds me of how we went to war against Iraq The lead author of the WSJ piece on the "sick lab workers" is the same author that helped get us into Iraq with a NYT article on Hussein's nuclear WMD program in 2002.

andreilys 5y ago
It’s almost like those two pieces are completely unrelated to one another. If you’re looking for someone with a clean record commenting on the viability of the lab leak theory for months, take a look at Bret Weinstein.
- amazingman 5y ago
  I took a look at Bret Weinstein, and it wasn’t good. Not good at all. He seemed to be making every effort he could to blame the mRNA vaccines for problems that —if true— could have any number of mundane explanations. But hey, maybe he’s right about the lab leak theory.
  - Wolfenstein98k 5y ago
    Yeah sadly he's gone off the deep end on "spike protein", but he has been a good fount on the origins of covid.
    - bavell 5y ago
      I'm curious what makes you think he's "gone off the deep end"?
      - gameswithgo 5y ago
        bret and his brother eric have made a name for themselves as contrarians. right or wrong they will take a hot take on whatever hot topic is available and do the podcast and tweet tour with it, all the while screaming to their millions of listeners how they are being silenced.

iratewizard 5y ago

I have trouble imagining what an external auditor established in China would look like. A worldwide rating similar to credit ratings, where failing to play the game correctly results in sanctions? If China's IP history has shown us anything, it's that they will do whatever they want with reckless abandon.

jdavis703 5y ago
It could look something like nuclear inspectors. Every country in an arms control treaty gets to send their inspectors in to verify adherence to the agreement.

y04nn 5y ago

I like the term "normalization of deviance" and would recommand the Mike Mullane's talk on the Challenger disaster [1]. [1]: https://youtu.be/Ljzj9Msli5o https://youtu.be/Ljzj9Msli5o

pyuser583 5y ago

Does NASA have outside auditors with a highly adversarial relationship reviewing its launch procedures? I don’t think it does. I’m pretty sure NASA has an excellent internal team of quality control specialists. The specialists are a part of all aspects of deployment and launch. They don’t just pop in and review work, they’re constantly there. They’re also very much “part of the team.” They don’t strictly speaking “have teeth.” They’re focused on the same mission everyone else is, only with a special focus on making it happen safely. Maybe you mean something like the relationship between the FAA and airline industry. But that’s very different from how NASA operates. So it’s clearly not the only model.

aj3 5y ago
The whole saga with the outside oversight is also a complete red herring. USA would never sign a treaty that required them to show their own facilities. Case in point: biological weapons convention. A few years back there was a very popular proposal to add “teeth”, i.e. random inspections and stuff. Guess who bailed out and passed a Hague invasion act instead? EDIT: grammar