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SSL certificates for HTTPS are a big fat scam. Why do I need to pay money to get a certificate, just to provide encryption. Encryption should be separate from
by axod 18y ago
SSL certificates for HTTPS are a big fat scam. Why do I need to pay money to get a certificate, just to provide encryption.
Encryption should be separate from identity verification.
Of course identity verification should be properly vetted and you should have to pay a fee, and have documents checked etc.
If however, you just want to provide security for your users by encrypting http, you should not have to jump through hoops and spend money.
- olavk 18y agoBut what good is encrypted communication if you cant be sure who you are communication with?
- y0ghur7_xxx 18y agoIt is good because that way you know that nobody in between can see your traffic. And more often than not it is enough to know that you are talking to the same site you talked to the last time (just like with SSH). The idea of "no lock icon" in case of a self signed/unknown CA certificate is a really good idea IMHO. The traffic is encrypted, but it does not give the user a false sense of security.
- sigstoat 18y agoIf you don't know who you're talking to, then there is no point in encrypting the data, because you're probably talking to the attacker. ("Man In The Middle") Now, the idea of "I'm talking to the same person I talked to last time" is useful, but if the users are all conditioned to accept random certificates without understanding, then when they go back a second time (and the attacker is waiting), they'll agree to the new cert, just like they did the first time.
- trevelyan 18y agoIf you've ever run an e-commerce site, you'll know that payments drop off significantly when browsers start throwing up warning signs.
- tptacek 18y agoWhich is good, because without that dropoff, your customers security would be an externality to you.
- y0ghur7_xxx 18y agoIf you create an account on happykittens.com, you don't really care if the cert happykittens.com is sending you is signed by a trusted CA. What you care about is that the second time you visit the site, when you log in with your brand new account, that the cert the site sends you is the same you received when you created the account (the site is the same you created the account on). This has nothing to do with the fact that the cert is signed from a trusted CA or not, and thus, making it difficult for the user to accept a SS cert is not the right solution IMHO.
- tptacek 18y agoKey continuity is a fine answer to this problem. Just come up with a way to provide it on every device every user might reasonably want to log in from, for every site on the Internet.
- axod 18y agoRegardless, it's still better than straight HTTP. HTTP < Encrypted HTTP < Encrypted,signed HTTP
- huhtenberg 18y agoActually, no. For all practical intents and purposes encryption w/o authentication is as good as no encryption. Unauthenticated encryption is 'better' than a plaintext in just one thing - it protects against passive snooping. Anyone willing to splice the connection will have full access to all your plaintext data and you won't even know about it. As such it's nothing more than an equivalent of reversible traffic obfuscation. So if your "better" meant "obfuscated", then, yeah, it's better. But it's no more secure (in a conventional security sense) than a plaintext.
- deleted 18y ago[deleted]
- josefresco 18y agoWhat good is verified communication when you can buy an SSL cert with pretty much any fake information you want.
- huhtenberg 18y agoI'd like to know where I can buy a cert this way. Pretty please.
- 45454564654 18y agoAll that's require are scanned documents. And these documents can easily be tampered with or photoshopped. You may think your company details are checked before the cert is issued, but that's crap. We email our docs to a US company, and all the docs are issued by Irish government departments. There's no way in hell that some guy in what amounts to a call centre in the US has access to any Irish database to prove or disprove their validity. SSL certs are a crock of shit - all you need to do to get one you're not entitled to is to be slightly outside the norm, and claiming any small country as your location is good enough for that. Hell, you could make up your own government departments and documents, and that'd be good enough for must of these companies.
- tptacek 18y agoGive me a break. This is like saying all online security is a sham because I can always physically break into your office. You know how many times a real CA has fucked up and accidentally issued a Bank of America certificate to organized criminals in Estonia? ZERO.
- nickf 18y agoYou can say it's crap all you want, but until you've worked inside a CA and seen what goes on - you know shit. Good luck ordering a cert with your 'shopped docs...
- tptacek 18y agoNo good at all. Which is why you can't buy an SSL certificate that claims to be onlinebanking.bankofamerica.com.
- axod 18y agoMainly it means that your employer/ISP/someone else using same lan/wifi etc can't sniff your packets. Encryption is useful, and separate to identity verification.
- nickf 18y agoEncryption is nothing without identity assurance. If you don't know who you're sending the encrypted data to - why bother encrypting in the first place?
- iigs 18y agoCommercial certificates are not a scam. You're paying for a company (the CA) to certify (via the SSL cert signature) that an identity belongs to someone that has provided proof that they're who they say they are. You can absolutely do what you're requesting by creating your own CA and signing certs for your sites and distributing your CA cert to your users somehow. If you can figure out how to reliably provide this service for free you could revolutionize crypto on the internet. You might start by looking at what cacert.org has done to see what problems they've hit and why it's not as easy as it seems.
- tptacek 18y agoYou are absolutely paying a premium based on the market persuasion tactics Verisign and Thawte have employed against the world. It's true that there's no good reason to trust Verisign more than Mozilla, Microsoft, and OpenSSL --- if Mozilla fucks up, you're just as screwed as if Verisign does. The business model behind certificates may very well be a huge scam. Unfortunately, the technical model behind having a small number of trusted certificates shipped with your browser is not. Until that link breaks, you don't get security without paying Verisign.
- nickf 18y agoIt's amazing how many people still think Verisign are the only CA out there. There are a lot now, and if you hunt about, you needn't pay more than $10-$20 for a cert that's trusted in most browsers (granted, they are domain-only validated, but that's a whole different issue that needs to be fixed, I won't bring it up here...) The reason you 'trust' Verisign/Thawte/Comodo/Geotrust/GoDaddy is because their roots are in the OSs & browsers. You can't get in those root stores without a hell of a lot of hoop-jumping. I know this. The money you pay for a cert does go to covering the costs of the background checks you have to pass through before you get the certificate. Trust has to start somewhere - why not with large companies who have undergone rigorous procedures that also have been vetted by the companies you're implicitly trusting by installing their software?
- tptacek 18y ago