4 ms·

Isn't this public knowledge? I remember a guest lecturer talking about this 15 years ago when I was in university.

by jeltz 5y ago

sneak 5y ago
Public knowledge and widely known are two different things. There are things that everyone could know (A), things that everyone knows (B), and things that everyone knows that everyone knows[3] (C). These are distinct sets. The fact that direct access to FAANG servers[2] is granted without a warrant to the US government was widely publicized, yet most people still don't realize that the NSA is regularly looking at naked pictures of Americans stored in cloud services[1]. You might even be aware of this, but have missed the (reported at the same time) fact that this is the #1 source, the most-often used, in US intelligence reports. It's where they do most of their spying. People haven't moved on to C about the non-privacy of gmail, for instance. Everyone savvy knows that gmail is compromised, yet because not everyone knows that everyone knows that, it's still pretended that your email box is private. Publicity is helpful. Most people are too busy to realize what is being done by their military in their name. Repetition helps. [1]: https://youtu.be/XEVlyP4_11M?t=1495 https://youtu.be/XEVlyP4_11M?t=1495 [2]: FISA Amendments Act Section 702, internal codename PRISM, reported in FAANG transparency reports as FISA orders [3]: https://www.epsilontheory.com/harvey-weinstein-common-knowledge-game/ https://www.epsilontheory.com/harvey-weinstein-common-knowle... and https://www.epsilontheory.com/sheep-logic/ https://www.epsilontheory.com/sheep-logic/
espadrine 5y ago
This is a case where different ciphers, for more advanced uses, are discovered as purposefully weakened. A5/2 (for voice communication, incl 2G) was known as a purposefully weakened variant of A5/1 for a very long time, and is probably what you remember. A5/3 (3G) and A5/4 (4G) are assumed not to be purposefully weakened, but are theoretically broken and, for related keys, practically broken. But what this research was about, was GEA/1 and GEA/2 (for data encryption in EDGE/2G). It was known to be practically broken, but not purposefully broken until now.
beermonster 5y ago
I recall being aware of A5 not being very strong and that fact not being much of a secret. But there’s a difference between using something known to be weaker than something else and using something that has been deliberately weakened in a way that allows compromise of that channel with that knowledge - which seems to be the suggestion in this article? At that point it’s not weaker crypto, more a back door.

Isn't this public knowledge? I remember a guest lecturer talking about this 15 years ago when I was in university.

by jeltz 5y ago

Isn't this public knowledge? I remember a guest lecturer talking about this 15 years ago when I was in university.

Public knowledge and widely known are two different things. There are things that everyone could know (A), things that everyone knows (B), and things that everyone knows that everyone knows[3] (C). These are distinct sets. The fact that direct access to FAANG servers[2] is granted without a warrant to the US government was widely publicized, yet most people still don't realize that the NSA is regularly looking at naked pictures of Americans stored in cloud services[1]. You might even be aware of this, but have missed the (reported at the same time) fact that this is the #1 source, the most-often used, in US intelligence reports. It's where they do most of their spying. People haven't moved on to C about the non-privacy of gmail, for instance. Everyone savvy knows that gmail is compromised, yet because not everyone knows that everyone knows that, it's still pretended that your email box is private. Publicity is helpful. Most people are too busy to realize what is being done by their military in their name. Repetition helps. [1]: https://youtu.be/XEVlyP4_11M?t=1495 https://youtu.be/XEVlyP4_11M?t=1495 [2]: FISA Amendments Act Section 702, internal codename PRISM, reported in FAANG transparency reports as FISA orders [3]: https://www.epsilontheory.com/harvey-weinstein-common-knowledge-game/ https://www.epsilontheory.com/harvey-weinstein-common-knowle... and https://www.epsilontheory.com/sheep-logic/ https://www.epsilontheory.com/sheep-logic/

espadrine 5y ago

This is a case where different ciphers, for more advanced uses, are discovered as purposefully weakened. A5/2 (for voice communication, incl 2G) was known as a purposefully weakened variant of A5/1 for a very long time, and is probably what you remember. A5/3 (3G) and A5/4 (4G) are assumed not to be purposefully weakened, but are theoretically broken and, for related keys, practically broken. But what this research was about, was GEA/1 and GEA/2 (for data encryption in EDGE/2G). It was known to be practically broken, but not purposefully broken until now.

beermonster 5y ago

I recall being aware of A5 not being very strong and that fact not being much of a secret. But there’s a difference between using something known to be weaker than something else and using something that has been deliberately weakened in a way that allows compromise of that channel with that knowledge - which seems to be the suggestion in this article? At that point it’s not weaker crypto, more a back door.