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Right, I'm familiar with the hack. My point is Target almost certainly didn't decide that the HVAC firm could be trusted to have access to the credit terminals
by alksjdalkj 5y ago
Right, I'm familiar with the hack. My point is Target almost certainly didn't decide that the HVAC firm could be trusted to have access to the credit terminals - the fact that they had access was the result of poor security design, not Target's threat model.
- SEJeff 5y agoOk fair. I see the lack of simple things like segmented vlans as a lack of a threat model entirely. They trusted them implicitly, not explicitly, through their clear incompetence. Perhaps that’s better? I think we are mostly in agreement.
- EricE 5y agoI've often found poor security designs justified by many of the arguments in this thread that it's unreasonable to treat everything as a threat. They know it's a bad design but doesn't matter because the threat is too improbable. Until it isn't :p
- SEJeff 5y agoI’ve been in meetings where executives have said precisely this and I have tried to gently nudge them towards defense in depth.
- dmos62 5y agoIt's the everything always part of the argument that's unreasonable. You realise that that's impossible? You can't vet and control the whole stack. And, if you could, it would be prohibitively expensive.
- SEJeff 5y agoFor certain use cases, it is not cost prohibitive. Take defense or banking…