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I can't help but be reminded that zero trust architecture for security has been a thing for at least a decade, and that the 2004 Jericho Forum concluded that p
by cratermoon 5y ago
I can't help but be reminded that zero trust architecture for security has been a thing for at least a decade, and that the 2004 Jericho Forum concluded that perimeter security was illusory, more akin to a picket fence than a wall.
- qbasic_forever 5y agoEveryone embracing immutable server configuration would help too. We give so many tools like docker complete trust to touch configuration and do the right thing. Sometimes it bites us though. In a perfect world you'd see docker try to change iptables and it fail, then investigate what's up and understand that a specific change has to be allowed and all the implications of that change.
- closeparen 5y agoPerimeter security would have been just fine here. The breach occurred because the host was exposed directly to the internet, rather than e.g. sharing a private network with a load balancer.
- cratermoon 5y agoClearly it was not fine, but in fact leaky, and depending only on perimeter security was (and is) flawed. See https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/commandments_v1.2.pdf https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/commandments_v1....
- closeparen 5y agoThere was no perimeter security here. The attacker did not first enter a private network and then pivot to MongoDB; he dialed MongoDB right from the internet. Had Mongo been un-authenticated on a private network it still might have been owned, but the bar would have been a lot higher. Side note: everything that’s ever existed is “flawed,” it’s a weird word to use in the context of something you want to discredit, because then your alternative had better be “flawless” and it obviously isn’t.
- fulafel 5y agoThere were several pieces here that conspired to produce the unfortunate end result, the blackmailing attacker exploiting the broken perimeter security was just the last piece.
- tremon 5y agoThere was no perimeter security here ...yet MongoDB's (default) configuration assumes there is. That's the big problem with perimeter security: applications offloading their security responsibility to other, possibly imaginary, parts of the system.
- JamesSwift 5y agoThere was perimeter security in this case. The user diligently configured a white-list only UFW firewall. That is their perimeter. Docker diligently sidestepped that firewall, and in so doing exposed that this was a case of perimeter security. Because by bypassing that single external filter, the entire service was now vulnerable.
- closeparen 5y agoI guess this is hair-splitting semantics, but I think when most people say "perimeter security" in the context of a web production environment, they mean that things like DBs, message queues, and backend services share a private network with the servers that actually terminate user TCP connections. Obviously with only perimeter security, those servers are soft targets to an attacker who compromises a frontend host. I am all for hardening the interior. "Don't put stuff on the internet that doesn't need to be, even if you think it's secure, because it's probably complicated enough for you to be mistaken about that." This is a perimeter security philosophy, and also what OP needed. If anything the host-level firewall mishap seems closer to an application-level authz bypass than to a pivot across a "trustworthy" network.
- evgen 5y agoBelieving that a zero trust architecture is a replacement for perimeter security is just as illusory and dangerous. Defense in depth ensures that a vulnerability or temporary configuration mistake in one facet of security does not lead to total compromise.