3 ms·
Maybe depends on your definition of VM? I think the way you phrased it, I read it as VM in the sense of host guest (eg QEMU, VMware, etc). Spectre and meltdown
by vlovich123 5y ago
Maybe depends on your definition of VM? I think the way you phrased it, I read it as VM in the sense of host guest (eg QEMU, VMware, etc).
Spectre and meltdown were broader. So in this case, if you loaded a script into your own process and executed in its own sandbox (eg Lua, JavaScript, Python, etc) that script could now access the containing process’ memory space whereas without spectre and Meltdown it couldn’t. Those attacks are still relevant and browser vendors are trying to be very careful here to not reintroduce gadgets that could be used to resurrect the attack. It’s also not just browsers. Notepad++ had to patch some things in its plugin system to protect against spectre/meltdown if I recall correctly.
In fact, the original spectre and meltdown vulnerabilities impacted the kernel on the same machine so process A could read process B’s memory although to my knowledge that’s been largely mitigated. You do have the Rowhammer attacks and those have not been mitigated so all these attack vectors are still a concern.
- staticassertion 5y agoI'm talking about any program that provides an execution environment for other, untrusted programs.
- a1369209993 5y ago> In fact, the original spectre and meltdown vulnerabilities impacted the kernel on the same machine so process A could read process B's memory Not quite; process A could read kernel memory, but reading process B's memory requires a further security problem[0] such as the kernel having the entire physical memory space identity mapped (for Meltdown or for Spectre with gadgets) or the kernel running ('near' enough to speculate) specter-exploitable gadgets when context-switched to process B (for Spectre). 0: It argubly wasn't a vulnerability until Meltdown and Spectre entered the threat model, but it evidently should have been, since they in fact did.