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As ever with security questions, the answer to that depends a lot on your threat model. Microsoft say that the main features of TPMs are that they [1]: > Gene
by azalemeth 5y ago
As ever with security questions, the answer to that depends a lot on your threat model.
Microsoft say that the main features of TPMs are that they [1]:
> Generate, store, and limit the use of cryptographic keys.
> Use TPM technology for platform device authentication by using the TPM’s unique RSA key, which is burned into itself.
> Help ensure platform integrity by taking and storing security measurements.
One can, in principle, imagine situations á la Apple's T2 chip whereby this could be very useful to the end user -- for example, in hardware rate-limiting whole drive encryption decryption requests. Microsoft don't actually state this as a potential use-case. They go for the rather more prosaic
> Antimalware software can use the boot measurements of the operating system start state to prove the integrity of a computer running Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016. These measurements include the launch of Hyper-V to test that datacenters using virtualization are not running untrusted hypervisors. With BitLocker Network Unlock, IT administrators can push an update without concerns that a computer is waiting for PIN entry.
The rest of the page then goes on about hardware attestation. In reality, I am increasingly convinced that this is all an elaborate DRM scheme, similar to what they integrated in the XBox, with its on-chip crypto. I think we will see increasingly user-hostile, but more "transparent" DRM schemes based around this idea, and continue the cat-and-mouse game of "you are running this code in a VM and that is unauthorised for $MONEY_REASONS".
I'll stick to Linux, thanks.
[1] https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/information-protection/tpm/trusted-platform-module-overview https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/informatio...
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- hakfoo 5y agoI'm worried that pushing whole-disc encryption at people who aren't aware of the consequences is a huge risk. I suspect for most consumer and small-business users, the risk of "a power surge blew out my motherboard and TPM, but I can take the surviving SSD and plunk it in a new PC and salvage my data" is a much more important use case than "someone might steal my PC and get at my valuable unencrypted data." I know we've heard people screaming about this on the MacOS side, but thereit's intertwined with the unrecoverability of a soldered storage subsystem. Large and technical organizations who might need the encryption are hopefully more likely to have IT staff and policies for backups and recovery, so they'll be able to handle that emergency better.
- GekkePrutser 5y agoYes this. I've scraped my SSD for data after it blew up :) The data wasn't that valuable otherwise I'd have had it backed up. The problem is it's my game PC. I don't want to constantly backup and sync all my game files as I can easily re-download them anyway and they take a ton of space. The savegames I do want backed up ideally but they're all over the filesystem. So, I recovered some that way. It was educational too, trying to scrape stuff off a broken NTFS image. But I certainly don't need or want my desktop PC encrypted. I only use my Windows box for gaming and I don't want to waste performance on it.
- easton 5y agoIn Windows 10 today, enabling BitLocker backups the keys to your AAD/Microsoft Account (depending on Home or Pro). If you hook the drive to another Windows machine you should be able to decrypt it with not a lot of trouble (you might have to log into the Azure Portal to pull the keys out if you are in a corporate environment, but that's it).
- tiagod 5y agoDoesn't this defeat the purpose (at least partially?) I assume law enforcement can request those keys from Microsoft if they're backed up to the account.
- ptk 5y agoI think the threat models of the overwhelming majority of individuals would prioritize scenarios that involve lost or stolen laptops/desktops over law enforcement. So Microsoft defaulting to protecting the security needs of the common man over criminals seems entirely reasonable to me. Criminals (or the security/privacy conscious) can organize their enterprises to make sure that their BitLocker keys aren’t stored where law enforcement agencies can get them. And I say that as someone who really does have concerns about the possibility that this can be abused, but I still believe it’s a reasonable default.