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It's worth noting that the people in that movie were WAY more loud and emotional than the real NASA engineers and operators. You can see how NASA people react

It's worth noting that the people in that movie were WAY more loud and emotional than the real NASA engineers and operators. You can see how NASA people react to tough situations by watching the videos of mission control during the Challenger and Columbia disasters. No shouting. No arguments. Just cool professionalism and restrained emotions. They have a job to do, and they do it well even under stress. "Steely-eyed missile men/women" indeed.

bumby 5y ago
>the people in that movie were WAY more loud and emotional than the real NASA engineers and operators. There are plenty of NASA engineers and leaders who lose their cool. I’m only saying that so people don’t overly lionize them in a way that prevents them from pursuing a similar job because they feel they are somehow cut from a different cloth.
- erosenbe0 5y ago
  Everybody knows that when presented with the irrefutable evidence that the Challenger o-rings would fail, they more or less just let the astronauts die. Definitely cut from same cloth as any other org.
  - bumby 5y ago
    That’s not quite accurate. It wasn’t that there was “irrefutable” evidence that the o-rings would fail, it was there wasn’t data that they would, or wouldn’t, fail. “The O-rings were never tested in extreme cold.”[1] There wasn’t data which led to discussions about uncertainty, but that shouldn’t be conflated with irrefutable evidence of failure. The obviousness of it (like many engineering failures) was only apparent in hindsight. “Evidence, in retrospect, points to a long period of time, especially based on post-flight inspections when the joint design weakness was ‘sending a message’ and the true potential of this message was not perceived and reacted to.”[2] “Not perceived” isn’t compatible with “irrefutable evidence that it would fail”. [1] https://www.space.com/31732-space-shuttle-challenger-disaster-explained-infographic.html https://www.space.com/31732-space-shuttle-challenger-disaste... [2]https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/...

bumby 5y ago

>the people in that movie were WAY more loud and emotional than the real NASA engineers and operators. There are plenty of NASA engineers and leaders who lose their cool. I’m only saying that so people don’t overly lionize them in a way that prevents them from pursuing a similar job because they feel they are somehow cut from a different cloth.

erosenbe0 5y ago
Everybody knows that when presented with the irrefutable evidence that the Challenger o-rings would fail, they more or less just let the astronauts die. Definitely cut from same cloth as any other org.
- bumby 5y ago
  That’s not quite accurate. It wasn’t that there was “irrefutable” evidence that the o-rings would fail, it was there wasn’t data that they would, or wouldn’t, fail. “The O-rings were never tested in extreme cold.”[1] There wasn’t data which led to discussions about uncertainty, but that shouldn’t be conflated with irrefutable evidence of failure. The obviousness of it (like many engineering failures) was only apparent in hindsight. “Evidence, in retrospect, points to a long period of time, especially based on post-flight inspections when the joint design weakness was ‘sending a message’ and the true potential of this message was not perceived and reacted to.”[2] “Not perceived” isn’t compatible with “irrefutable evidence that it would fail”. [1] https://www.space.com/31732-space-shuttle-challenger-disaster-explained-infographic.html https://www.space.com/31732-space-shuttle-challenger-disaste... [2]https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-99hrpt1016/pdf/...