> Yes, you can argue that the more extremely somebody puts the ranges, they have an advantage. Yes, when aggregating preferences in one dimension using the ari

> Yes, you can argue that the more extremely somebody puts the ranges, they have an advantage. Yes, when aggregating preferences in one dimension using the arithmetic mean, people with a more divergent preference have relatively more impact. > (I would argue we should always normalize the cast vote so that most wanted candidate gets 100 and the least wanted 0, ... Yes, all other things equal, this appears like a reasonable thing to do.* > but then we take away people's ability to express only mild interest.) And through that, they can in certain cases manipulate the outcome. Right. You've given a clear example of the complexity of balancing desirable properties in voting systems. * The problem of course is that there are many reasonable properties that most reasonable people would want, and yet, they don't coexist well.