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> Arrow’s impossibility theorem First off, Arrow's doesn't apply to all systems. You'll need to look into both Gibbard's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems.
by godelski 5y ago
> Arrow’s impossibility theorem
First off, Arrow's doesn't apply to all systems. You'll need to look into both Gibbard's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems.
Second off, just because you can't find a global optimization in a highly dimensional space doesn't mean there aren't local optimizations along criteria we care more about. Appealing to Arrow's is a cop-out.
> Approval voting I think is much too tactical and, strictly speaking, worse than IRV. No contest.
You're going to have to back this up with some strong evidence. Approval has higher VSE, is simpler, is more resistant to spoilers and tactical voting.
> IRV lets people express their preferences in a fairly understandable way.
Actually your argument holds true for any ordinal or cardinal system. Cardinal even having more flexibility since you can give two candidates the same score. And in cardinal if you want to rank your candidates, no problem. Better yet, you have better encoding opportunities because you can specify the distance between your ranking instead of the uniform spacing that ordinal systems force upon you. (BTW, given what the person above you wrote, I would assume that they know how ranked voting works and explaining how it is going to come off as you calling them dumb).
- klodolph 5y agoI disagree that cardinal voting is understandable. It’s how we rate restaurants and review products on Amazon, and I don’t think it translates to an election with multiple options. The issue here is not just how logical humans “homo economicus” behaves, but how actual voters behave. Not really interested in engaging with the rest of this comment right now, but suffice it to say that I don’t think you’re accounting for human behavior in practice, which is messy and illogical. I don’t think it’s reasonable to say that I’m appealing to Arrow’s impossibility theorem as a cop-out—I’m saying that since we don’t have a game theoretic solution the the problem, we should look at the actual behavior of imperfect, irrational humans as the deciding factor.
- godelski 5y ago> I disagree that cardinal voting is understandable. It’s how we rate restaurants and review products on Amazon, and I don’t think it translates to an election with multiple options. I disagree but also don't see this as a problem. If you rank candidates you still get the majority of the desirable properties. Rank with non-equal distances, even better. Hell, it isn't even bad if you bullet vote (that's just approval voting). Investigating non-optimal ways of voting under any voting system is an extremely important analysis. So for the voter there is no problem. I'm also kinda put off that you give real world examples of humans using cardinal methods and then claiming that we can't understand it (HN is using cardinal voting...) But we also have to consider the counting of votes side of "understandable." Plurality is pretty damn easy, and this is clearly why we use it. Approval is almost as easy (just just sum multiple columns). Range/Score isn't much harder. Then STAR introduces 2 rounds of counting. Then we look at IRV and we see that we have tons of rounds. This isn't typically so bad in a presidential election where there are realistically about 4 candidates, but that complexity increases real fast elsewhere. Just watch NYC. There's going to be at least 5 rounds (probably more). This is far more complex. We only have to look at Arizona to understand why this part of the "understandable" question is important.
- magila 5y agoOne big problem with approval voting is that it presents voters with a difficult conundrum: what do you do with candidates you don't particularly like but would still strongly prefer over one-or-more other candidates? If people are too lenient with their approval it increases the risk of someone no one really likes getting elected over someone a majority would have preferred. If people are too stringent you start running into the same problems as FTTP. Approval voting has some nice mathematical properties, but I think in practice trying to pidgeon hole people's preferences into a binary decision would be a major source of voter frustration and lead to tactical voting.
- godelski 5y agoFine, go STAR or Score/Range. Honestly I prefer those systems (in that order and I'd argue most people that are pro cardinal systems have that same preference[0]). Nice benefit is that people can bullet vote and we collapse to Approval which is a "good enough" system. > but would still strongly prefer over one-or-more other candidates? In fact, this is why I argue for STAR or score. It encodes information for better than a ranked (ordinal) system. In any ranked system you encode your preference with equidistant from one another. Where as when you score you can indicate a much stronger preference. Here's an example. Let's say I REALLY like candidate A, moderately like candidate B, and strongly dislike candidate C. Ranked: A > B > C (with my encoding I'm saying that my preference of A over B is the same as my preference of B over C) Scoring A: 10, B: 7, C:0 (with this encoding I can indicate that my preference of A over B is not as large as my preference of B over C. Obviously we are capturing more information here) Let's just encode information better, I agree. But also let's consider other factors like how easy it is to count the votes (which every cardinal system is going to beat ranked systems). [0] That same preference where the distance between STAR, Score, and Approval is smaller than the distance between preference of Approval over IRV (e.g. STAR: 10, Score: 8, Approval: 7, IRV: 3, Plurality: 0).
- ad8e 5y agoSmall correction: The term "bullet voting" means voting for one candidate only (001000), rather than voting 0 or 1 on each candidate (101011). It is caused by low engagement from the voters, who only take the time to learn about one candidate, their favorite. It has been a problem for approval voting in practice, and it is unclear to what extent it affects score methods in practice. I think STAR is slightly worse than Score, is comparable to Approval, is much better than IRV, and is likely better than Condorcet methods. STAR has some odd behavior which can be explored in a 3-person race. Score has less-problematic behavior caused by risk-taking with equilibrium voters (not like voters behave in any way similar to Nash equilibria though, and who knows what the real-world behavior will be). However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming political resistance, if its properties are simpler to convince voters. Majority criterion sounds nice even when it is inefficient. Much like Top Trading Cycles losing to Gale-Shapley in school choice algorithms (excluding Boston).
- justinpombrio 5y agoFor anyone like me who hadn't heard of Gibbard's theorem, it's actually even simpler (and more depressing) than Arrow's theorem. To quote Wikipedia: For any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold: 1. The process is dictatorial, i.e. there exists a distinguished agent who can impose the outcome; 2. The process limits the possible outcomes to two options only; 3. The process is open to strategic voting: once an agent has identified their preferences, it is possible that they have no action at their disposal that best defends these preferences irrespective of the other agents' actions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%27s_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%27s_theorem ---- So basically, it's impossible to completely eliminate strategic voting. No matter the method: ranked vs. cardinal vs. anything else you dream up can't help.
- pksebben 5y agoaccording to Wikipedia: >Gibbard's theorem states that a deterministic process of collective decision cannot be straightforward, except possibly in two cases: if there is a distinguished agent who has a dictatorial power, or if the process limits the outcome to two possible options only. .. it also mentions that gibbard's is specifically about irv. All that aside, I can't understand the idea that we only get to change things once. My understanding of history is at odds with the concept.
- justinpombrio 5y ago> .. it also mentions that gibbard's is specifically about irv. No, Gibbard's is not limited to any particular voting method. I think you're misreading the next paragraph (and also confusing IRV, which is a particular method, with ranked choice, which is a whole category of methods). Note the distinction between Gibbard and Gibbard-Satterthwaite: > A corollary of this theorem is Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem about voting rules. The main difference between the two is that Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is limited to ranked (ordinal) voting rules: a voter's action consists in giving a preference ranking over the available options. Gibbard's theorem is more general and considers processes of collective decision that may not be ordinal: for example, voting systems where voters assign grades to candidates.
- logicchop 5y ago> Cardinal even having more flexibility I thought Gibbard-Satterthwaite (or maybe just Gibbard's version) applied to cardinal systems as well. This seemed likely to me for some reason, as if an ordinal method could approximate any particular cardinal discretization by just including "ghost" candidates that can be packed (ordinally) between your actual candidates.
- godelski 5y ago> I thought Gibbard-Satterthwaite (or maybe just Gibbard's version) applied to cardinal systems as well. Correct, but it is also a weaker version of Arrow's (also as Clay points out, Arrow's isn't really about voting[0]...) > This seemed likely to me for some reason, as if an ordinal method could approximate any particular cardinal discretization by just including "ghost" candidates that can be packed (ordinally) between your actual candidates. Okay, but this just adds complexity. Cardinal is already simpler than ordinal systems (both for voters _and_ for those counting the votes). There's absolutely nothing wrong ranking candidates in a cardinal system (it's actually pretty unlikely that you'll have the same preference for multiple candidates so this is going to naturally happen). The difference? In cardinal you can better express your preference of one candidate over another (I give an example here[1]). So now we've added "encoding efficiency" to the added benefit of cardinal systems. Cardinal systems are better than ordinal systems in almost every single way (the only thing I can think of ordinal systems doing better at is that RP and Schulze perform better on maximal VSE, but as I discuss here[2] that is pretty limited as well as unlikely considering strategic voting and the ability to manipulate people exists). [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27598975 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27598975 [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27599324 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27599324 [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27600248 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27600248