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You're last name doesn't have to be Arrow to know that there's a potential for a non-compromise candidate to win, indeed for the candidate that a majority don't
by hackeraccount 5y ago
You're last name doesn't have to be Arrow to know that there's a potential for a non-compromise candidate to win, indeed for the candidate that a majority don't want in office to win.
- JumpCrisscross 5y ago> there's a potential for a non-compromise candidate to win Agree IRV isn't the perfect system. But we have the downsides of being broadly explicable (Condorcet method's weakness), continuous with existing civic culture (approval voting's weakness), squeezing the centre (RCV/IRV's weakness) and being better than autocracy (plurality's weakness). With some irony, the game of reforming voting systems is itself a plurality mechanism. IRV, re-branded as RCV, has taken off. It has precedence. The distance between each of RCV's competitors and it is dwarfed by the distance between each of them and FPTP. Given that, unifying around the winning "candidate" makes sense. Put another way, bringing up approval voting in an IRV vs. FPTP discussion favors FPTP. If one wants a world in which approval voting reigns, I think it would be easier to get there with IRV as an in-between.
- tunesmith 5y agoI've never really understood the criticism of Condorcet's method being hard to understand. If one candidate would beat all other candidates head-to-head, that candidate should be the winner. That's really it. People get hung up on the loop-breaking algorithms when they're not really the point.