Let’s get to the bottom of the mistrust we are trying to overcome, shall we? Whether via compiler, firmware, or rouge NIC, the attack vector which undermines tr

Let’s get to the bottom of the mistrust we are trying to overcome, shall we? Whether via compiler, firmware, or rouge NIC, the attack vector which undermines trust would take the shape of a system that could modify and/or exfiltrate data that the machine processes, or perhaps metadata about when and how the machine is used. How could one test if that attack was actually taking place? I would probably start with analyzing what packets a network card emits, or perhaps what is written to disk. If there were a ‘ground truth’ device that could be used as a baseline, such a comparison would be possible. Perhaps an older device that predates the modern security state, or some means of bypassing Secure Boot would suffice. From there, one could ascend the stack of turtles, verifying the outputs at each layer of abstraction. But who verifies the verifier? ;)