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We're prepping for a major new release too — information here: https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/2021/06/19/preparing-for-v0-4.html https://yggdrasil-network.

• infogulch 5y ago
  https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/2021/06/19/preparing-for-v0-4.html#keyspace https://yggdrasil-network.github.io/2021/06/19/preparing-for... > the root is the node with the lowest ed25519 public key, rather than the highest sha512sum hash of the public key With this scheme, could a bad actor decide to choose a poor key just to be the neighbor of a target in (edit) keyspace? Ordering by the hash of a public key means that the order is protected by the hash function's preimage resistance; does the generation of a ed25519 key have a similar protection?
  • miloignis 5y ago
    Even with preimage resistance, it seems like it wouldn't be insane to just burn cycles until you got one close enough, bitcoin-style. Dealing with attackers in a system like this seems very challenging, though very worthwhile in the end! Maybe something web-of-trust-y...
    • infogulch 5y ago
      My point is that I don't think there's anything during key generation that requires the resulting key to be secure / chosen 'well', so an attacker might exploit key generation as a way to target a particular spot in the line, where having an insecure/easily compromised key doesn't matter to them even though that may be detrimental to the health of the network. But at least with preimage resistance any public key is just as likely as any other to get a particular spot that they desire so there's no incentive to exploit key generation to get it, they might as well generate a bunch of secure keys if they want to use a bitcoin-style brute force strategy.