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Out of interest, what’s your reasoning for trusting HSM manufacturers less than Apple? HSM manufacturers are essentially selling security, so any security issu

Out of interest, what’s your reasoning for trusting HSM manufacturers less than Apple? HSM manufacturers are essentially selling security, so any security issue could destroy their business, whereas Apple would likely survive. I have seen pentests being done on an HSM and the steps they go to are quite impressive. Far further than I would ever have expected.

michaelt 5y ago
I don't know for sure that HSMs can't be trusted, but: 1. They're all closed-source, super-expensive devices that security researchers don't look at in any numbers. 2. We know getting security right is extremely difficult; products from big, sophisticated, motivated companies have security problems revealed by careful public scrutiny. A product that hasn't received such scrutiny seems unlikely to be better than that. 3. The first and biggest customer for obscure security hardware like TPMs and Smart Cards is the government/military. In my country, government/military tech efforts have a reputation for being delivered late and over budget; often ending in failure; and not being particularly secure. Are we to believe defence contractors managed to do a competent IT project when they couldn't do that before or after? 4. We know, from examples like Dual EC DRBG and Crypto AG, that governments will happily put in a backdoor when given the chance. If a giant defence contractor like Thales was asked by their number 1 customer to put in a backdoor, do you think they'd say no?
- marcan_42 5y ago
  This, and also: - Infineon and ROCA. We know the code audits the industry does are superficial and do not catch the worst bugs. That code would've been a big red flag for real cryptographers, and it would've been quickly found had it been open source. - Government requirements. Stuff like FIPS certification decreases security by increasing bureaucracy and complexity. See vulnerabilities affecting only the YubiKey FIPS for an example. These certifications hold the industry back by mandating compliance with large suites of algorithms, forbidding newer, better cryptography, and stuff like that. - The general culture of that industry. They sell security, and they are all about audits. Those audits are about ticking boxes. They do not measure good design, overall defense in depth, or anything like that. They are bullet point lists of security features and specific attack models. Interesting attacks use novel approaches, and those audits are completely worthless at determining whether a system is likely to be designed in a way to be robust against new attacks or not.
- danpalmer 5y ago
  I think HSMs are selling security (rather than security being an additional feature) and therefore you may be surprised at the amount of testing and scrutiny being done. As I mentioned, I saw a pentest happening, that included physical, network, software, pretty much anything that could be done over months. Issues like the Debian OpenSSL issues show that something being open source does not mean it's getting the scrutiny it needs, and while open source software is easier to apply that scrutiny to, I think the relationship is far more complicated than that. If a defence contractor like Thales was asked to put a backdoor in, do you think that wouldn't be found if their device was tested for months on end by external testers paid to, and motivated by, finding vulnerabilities. I'm not saying it doesn't happen, but I do think they deserve a little more credit than you may be giving them.
  - michaelt 5y ago
    > If a defence contractor like Thales was asked to put a backdoor in, do you think that wouldn't be found [..] by external testers There are many ways to design a back door that would pass such security audits, yes. One option is to simply give the auditors a device without the back door - or a firmware listing without it. You can also create bugs that are undetectable by black box testing - such as generating keys with insufficient entropy. Another is to copy subtle bugs from other products, that sat in plain sight for years. And of course the testers will all be under NDA so if they do find your back door, they’ve already promised to take part in your cover-up.

michaelt 5y ago

I don't know for sure that HSMs can't be trusted, but: 1. They're all closed-source, super-expensive devices that security researchers don't look at in any numbers. 2. We know getting security right is extremely difficult; products from big, sophisticated, motivated companies have security problems revealed by careful public scrutiny. A product that hasn't received such scrutiny seems unlikely to be better than that. 3. The first and biggest customer for obscure security hardware like TPMs and Smart Cards is the government/military. In my country, government/military tech efforts have a reputation for being delivered late and over budget; often ending in failure; and not being particularly secure. Are we to believe defence contractors managed to do a competent IT project when they couldn't do that before or after? 4. We know, from examples like Dual EC DRBG and Crypto AG, that governments will happily put in a backdoor when given the chance. If a giant defence contractor like Thales was asked by their number 1 customer to put in a backdoor, do you think they'd say no?

marcan_42 5y ago
This, and also: - Infineon and ROCA. We know the code audits the industry does are superficial and do not catch the worst bugs. That code would've been a big red flag for real cryptographers, and it would've been quickly found had it been open source. - Government requirements. Stuff like FIPS certification decreases security by increasing bureaucracy and complexity. See vulnerabilities affecting only the YubiKey FIPS for an example. These certifications hold the industry back by mandating compliance with large suites of algorithms, forbidding newer, better cryptography, and stuff like that. - The general culture of that industry. They sell security, and they are all about audits. Those audits are about ticking boxes. They do not measure good design, overall defense in depth, or anything like that. They are bullet point lists of security features and specific attack models. Interesting attacks use novel approaches, and those audits are completely worthless at determining whether a system is likely to be designed in a way to be robust against new attacks or not.
danpalmer 5y ago
I think HSMs are selling security (rather than security being an additional feature) and therefore you may be surprised at the amount of testing and scrutiny being done. As I mentioned, I saw a pentest happening, that included physical, network, software, pretty much anything that could be done over months. Issues like the Debian OpenSSL issues show that something being open source does not mean it's getting the scrutiny it needs, and while open source software is easier to apply that scrutiny to, I think the relationship is far more complicated than that. If a defence contractor like Thales was asked to put a backdoor in, do you think that wouldn't be found if their device was tested for months on end by external testers paid to, and motivated by, finding vulnerabilities. I'm not saying it doesn't happen, but I do think they deserve a little more credit than you may be giving them.
- michaelt 5y ago
  > If a defence contractor like Thales was asked to put a backdoor in, do you think that wouldn't be found [..] by external testers There are many ways to design a back door that would pass such security audits, yes. One option is to simply give the auditors a device without the back door - or a firmware listing without it. You can also create bugs that are undetectable by black box testing - such as generating keys with insufficient entropy. Another is to copy subtle bugs from other products, that sat in plain sight for years. And of course the testers will all be under NDA so if they do find your back door, they’ve already promised to take part in your cover-up.