I agree it was meandering and a mess in that sense, but I still enjoyed reading it. Normally I'd be bothered due a sense of wasted time but I think these issues

I agree it was meandering and a mess in that sense, but I still enjoyed reading it. Normally I'd be bothered due a sense of wasted time but I think these issues are worth thinking through, and even if not everything ties together in the essay I think they're relevant to one another topically. Sometimes I'm ok with many loose ends. For me, the Knightian uncertainty was interesting to think about in the context of free will and predictability, but it seemed as if the connection wasn't there in the way the author wanted it to be. At some point the author suggests that if Knightian uncertainty holds, "instead of being predictably unpredictable it is simply unpredictable, and cannot be described by straightforward mathematical probabilities. Instead it reflects the free will of a human being." Isn't Knightean uncertainty more reflective of an epistemological state of an observer/modeler? I mean, you can still assign probabilities to an event even if your model is wrong or extremely simple. Events that are truly random will still have probabilities assignable to them. I'm also deeply uncomfortable with the argument that seems to be creeping in in this essay and in elsewhere that unpredictability seems to be equated with free will. I do not see them as the same. Just as example, say your decision between A and B is replaced with a truly random event with 30-70% probabilities. Does that mean free will? I would say no. Free will has some other element associated with it, an element I haven't heard articulated very well yet.