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Where in there did Turing prove computation can "exactly reproduce the behavior to...(any physical system)"? Because we humans seem to be able to describe and w
by meroes 5y ago
Where in there did Turing prove computation can "exactly reproduce the behavior to...(any physical system)"? Because we humans seem to be able to describe and write down the behavior of any physical system? I'm not sure that jump is airtight.
I'm not sure we can say this part even though we might believe it to be true. I mean maybe now we can since we have no deeper theories than quantum field theories, and we can posit all of physical reality reduces to QFTs and GR and simulate all of QFT computationally either with quantum computers (in real time) or classical (not in real time + need a random number generator). But the we'd still have computational limits by which observables we can measure and how big of computations we can run (think size of computer limited by black hole density for one crude example - although I guess a blackhole could be used as a quantum computer. So then I'd say the speed of light is the other main limit, we've already lost the information to run certain calculations to the depths of space).
And to focus back in on the random number generator requirement for classical to simulate quantum...nothing fundamentally random can be simulated classically in principle. Yet randomness is needed to describe the most basic layer of reality. I can't get true randomness from classical no matter what.
- chriswarbo 5y ago> Where in there did Turing prove computation can "exactly reproduce the behavior to...(any physical system)"? Because we humans seem to be able to describe and write down the behavior of any physical system? Turing's scenario essentially applies to a person in a room, with an unlimited amount of paper (this could be a movable tape extending through the walls, to prevent the room filling up with paper!). However, the same argument works if we replace the person with any other physical system (e.g. some mechanical device, or some physics experiment), and replace the room with any finite region of space (e.g. the Milky Way galaxy). I don't remember Turing himself making this argument (let alone in his 1936 paper), but it's known as the "physical Church-Turing thesis" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#Variations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Church%E2%80%93Turing_thesis#V... (the Church-Turing thesis is the argument that all 'effective methods of calculation' can be carried out by a Turing machine) As for your points about quantum physics, etc. that's certainly true, and it's why the Church-Turing thesis isn't a theorem (and can't be, since we can never know if any particular model of reality is correct). However, it's certainly a valid physical law, akin to nothing moving faster than light, etc. i.e. it's empirically true, theoretically sound, and we have no better explanation for the moment. Perhaps its origin in mathematics, where it is a second-class citizen compared to provable theorems, prevented the Church-Turing thesis getting the recognition it deserves, e.g from physicists.
- foxes 5y agoWell I might add the quantum complexity-theory version of the Church–Turing thesis. I believe that quantum computation is a richer more powerful theory. In essence BQP is a superset of BPP in your link. I think this happens with all sorts of mathematical objects. Non commutative algebra is much richer than commutative algebra. There are also more interesting non commutative things than just deformations of classical objects. Its the classical commutative case that is the weird limit.
- chriswarbo 5y agoYeah, there are all sorts of layers we can add, especially regarding complexity (i.e. resource usage limits, rather than simple yes/no questions of decidability). It's interesting to consider P = NP as a physical law, although that's certainly more tenuous than the Church-Turing thesis, etc.