I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. I agree with this, at least mostly. I argue one can make certain modifications without causing p

I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. I agree with this, at least mostly. I argue one can make certain modifications without causing problems. Most people would probably agree that we can swap out an atom here or there, this already happens naturally anyway. And I see no upper limit for replacing pieces of the brain as long as the replacement is functionally equivalent. [...] we don't know if the arrangement of the atoms is enough to define a conscious mind. It does not matter, it is a thought experiment, we assume something and then think about the consequences of that assumption. So my description of the teletransporter is not to be understood literally, it will just do whatever is necessary to make it work. Sure, it is not impossible to make pointless thought experiments - assume X is true and X is false, what are the consequences - but in the case of the teletransporter I do not see why it matters for the discussion of person identity whether it is actually realizable. If we send not only the data but also the atoms over, then the teletransporter is in a certain sense a trivial device, going through the teletransporter is indistinguishable from you just walking from one device to the other, i.e. if we put the two devices onto a stage and hide them for some time behind the curtain, then the audience should be unable to figure out whether you used the teletransporter or whether you just walked over to the second device. If one wants to argue that a teleported person is not the same person afterwards, then - so it seems to me - one would either have to accept that walking also changes one person into another or one would have to explain why the details of how the person moved from A to B matters for person identity even though initial and final states are identical.