Implementing a legally-mandated wiretap requirement like CALEA doesn't require you to break your protocol (i.e. the transport layer). It is implemented at the a

Implementing a legally-mandated wiretap requirement like CALEA doesn't require you to break your protocol (i.e. the transport layer). It is implemented at the application layer, on the server. You can still have cryptographically secure communication between client and server while complying with wiretap laws. If you're concerned about your government intercepting your communications with a warrant, there's not really anything you can do except move to an E2E encrypted app like Signal. But if you're OK with only being monitored if a judge signs a warrant, then the GP's suggestion helps. These protocol backdoors are more dangerous than application-level wiretaps because anyone can find and use them; they might be private at first, but once they are discovered there's usually no way to fix them without moving to a new protocol (version). Protocol breaks seem to me to be more in the category of "added by the NSA through subterfuge or coercion in order to enable illegal warrantless surveillance", which I find much more concerning than publicly-known processes with (at least in theory) established due process like CALEA wiretaps. > You're better off treating it as untrusted and using your own encryption on top (eg. Signal). But yes, this is a sensible approach to the world-as-it-currently-is.