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I think you're mixing up a number of valid concerns which have different threat models: for example, the mass surveillance risks tend to involve things like car
by acdha 5y ago
I think you're mixing up a number of valid concerns which have different threat models: for example, the mass surveillance risks tend to involve things like carriers doing network traffic analysis or location monitoring, and things like open protocols or crypto don't really change the situation there since it doesn't depend on breaking encrypted traffic (unlike in the pre-TLS era when traffic wasn't encrypted).
Similarly, you can develop and document a crypto system but unless you're publicly funding a lot of adversarial research that doesn't prevent something like Dual_EC_DRBG being submitted in bad faith. I haven't seen any indication that the NIST team thought they were developing open standards — it's not like they sent a pull request from nsa/add-secret-backdoorz — and the level of effort needed to uncover these things can be substantial, requiring highly-specialized reviewers. That also hits all of the usual concerns about whether the cryptographic algorithm is secure but used in an unsafe manner, which can be even harder to detect.
The biggest win has simply been that these issues get a lot more public discussion and review now than they used to, and the industry has collectively agreed not to trust the infrastructure. Switching to things like TLS has done more to protect privacy than all of the lower level standards work and that's nice because e.g. a Signal or FaceTime user is still protected even if their traffic never touches a cellular network.
- a1369209993 5y ago> something like Dual_EC_DRBG being submitted in bad faith. That's a poor example, because everyone (who both knew anything about cryptography and actually bothered to read it) knew or suspected it was garbage. As [0] put it: > > and Dual_EC_DRBG was an accepted and publicly scrutinized standard. > And every bit of public scrutiny said the same thing: this thing is broken! 0: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/20/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/20/rsa-warn... see also: https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/18/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg/ https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/18/the-many...
- acdha 5y agoTrue: the angle I was focusing on is the demonstrated interest and willingness to spend time and credibility on it (see also Crypto AG). It’s safe to assume that will continue as society moves further online so we should assume well-funded concealed attempts to compromise implementations will continue.
- a1369209993 5y ago> the angle I was focusing on is the demonstrated interest and willingness to spend time and credibility on it Ah, fair enough. My point was that it's at least not demonstated, if not not true, that you need a lot of adversarial research to prevent something like Dual_EC_DRBG (specifically) being submitted in bad faith - you just need to actually bother to read the crypto specification you're considering adopting, and have the bare minimum competence to notice that there's no benefit to a number-theoretic design besides the ability to prove security relative to some presumed-hard task, and that there is no such proof.