5 ms·
"One of the most significant sections of the executive order is the requirement for all federal agencies to adopt multi-factor authentication within six months
by tyingq 5y ago
"One of the most significant sections of the executive order is the requirement for all federal agencies to adopt multi-factor authentication within six months (180 days) of the order being signed."
I will eat my hat if this happens in that timeframe.
- jmisavage 5y agoThat does seem far fetch considering how slow they move, but I wonder how many agencies have something like that already. Back when I worked as a government contractor I had to get a CAC card and use that with a card reader to sign into a computer when I had to visit a military base. That was about 2 decades ago (man that makes me feel old).
- sybercecurity 5y agoIt's hit and miss. Many civilian side agencies have PIV (the civilian version of CAC) cards for login to laptop/desktops, but not mobile phones/tablets. A few agencies have apps are PIV/CAC enabled or have any MFA, but usually one user/pass login. So you see situations where smartcards are used to login to a device, then a username/password to connect to webapps.
- jotux 5y agoAll of DoD uses CAC, which is probably 30%+ of federal employees. And probably 80%+ of all apps DoD employees use are CAC/PIV login.
- elliekelly 5y agoThis is the oldest compliance trick in the book. To adopt is easy. To implement is difficult. This is why some regulations specify “adopt and _implement_”. We adopted multi factor and now we’re in the process of rolling it out. At the moment Ted is our only user. But we aren’t not compliant.
- EricE 5y agoExactly. Policy without enforcement/oversight is just wish casting :p
- ComodoHacker 5y agoAnd hopefully a second factor won't be SMS.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agodear god, please no. So tired of the entities I have to deal with who only offer SMS for 2FA and not email. I tried to send some of them a stash of links about how insecure SMS is for this purpose, to no avail.
- toomuchtodo 5y ago> I will eat my hat if this happens in that timeframe. Login.gov (a product of USDS and 18F @ GSA) is positioned to meet these identity provider needs. https://www.login.gov/help/get-started/authentication-options/ https://www.login.gov/help/get-started/authentication-option... (2FA support for all users + PIV/CAC support for Fed Gov workers) https://developers.login.gov/ https://developers.login.gov/ (developer resources) Skepticism is warranted as 6 USC 1523: Federal cybersecurity requirements [1] has required a lot of what the EO is calling for for almost half a decade, but the tooling exists and 82 agency applications/systems (as of October 2020) are already leveraging this identity provider. Appropriations ($$$) for this identity integration work seems the challenge, as implementation is straightforward. Sidenote: You can now login to your Social Security Administration account with Login.gov [2] (under "Other Sign In Options"). If you've applied for TSA Precheck or Global Entry, you've been using Login.gov for some time. [1] https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-section1523&num=0&edition=prelim https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim... [2] https://secure.ssa.gov/RIL/SiView.action https://secure.ssa.gov/RIL/SiView.action (disclosure: no affiliation with any federal government agency or office, not a fed gov employee or contractor currently)
- jaywalk 5y agoHow is it affiliated with TSA Precheck? I'm quite sure I've never directly used login.gov for anything related to my TSA Precheck, and I don't have a password associated with it either.
- toomuchtodo 5y agoInteresting! It was my understanding that TSA Precheck was lumped in with Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI, all of which make up DHS'/CBP's Trusted Traveler Programs [1] [2]. I have Global Entry, so have not used the TSA Precheck enrollment flow (I steer those who ask to Global Entry, as it's only $15 more over 5 years vs Precheck and gives you everything TSA Precheck does but also CBP expedited clearance benefits at the US border). I'll have to do more research, thanks for pointing this out. Interestingly enough, the TSA Jobs portal does use Login.gov. [3] [1] https://login.gov/help/specific-agencies/trusted-traveler-programs/ https://login.gov/help/specific-agencies/trusted-traveler-pr... [2] https://ttp.dhs.gov/ https://ttp.dhs.gov/ [3] https://candidates.tsa.dhs.gov/s/ https://candidates.tsa.dhs.gov/s/
- choppaface 5y agoWill this make SMS-based MfA more vulnerable if the government chooses to adopt / implement using SMS? There are other options but if the EO only says MFA ..
- bskap 5y agoI think criminals gaining access to my bank account is far more lucrative for them than gaining access to my social security account so I don't think it makes the problem particularly worse than it already is. But besides that, the federal government already has an SSO provider that supports smart cards, U2F, and TOTP. I suspect many agencies will choose to adopt that rather than trying to roll their own SMS auth.
- staticassertion 5y agoIs it that hard to roll out MFA post-hoc? Feels like it shouldn't be, if it's a huge priority.
- tyingq 5y agoThe hard part is "all Federal agencies".
- ssully 5y agoTo expand upon that, the hard part is that every agency has a unique IT infrastructure (sometimes multiple infrastructures in a single organization) and budgets that vary wildly. It's not a one size fits all approach across the whole government. The important part of the EO is the section 3.d.i, which says that every 60 days, until MFA is fully adopted, the agencies will report to DHS their plan and progress for implementing MFA. So basically, they can take longer then 180 days, but they need to be transparent about their plan and the roadblocks they are hitting in doing so.
- mcguire 5y agoNASA has had 2FA for over a decade for internal users, RSA dongles initially and PIV cards now (there was something about JPL and the fingerprinting requirement, though). They have taken steps recently to get rid of passwords entirely, although legacy systems are a problem (like OpenShift). The down side is that accessing a server requires a patched Putty from Centrify and about 27 configuration steps that are documented nowhere.
- dralley 5y agoOpenShift isn't a legacy system, it's a commercially supported distribution of Kubernetes. That's about as close to "new hotness" as you're going to find in government. Unless you mean they're stuck on a version from 5+ years ago, which is believable, but hardly OpenShift's fault.
- mcguire 5y agoI mean that password authentication is all our installation supports.
- 3pt14159 5y agoIn 2001 I worked on a project for some of the federal agencies that used remote biometrics for authentication in addition to password use. I'm not sure if it was safe from replay attacks, but still. It wasn't that the feds didn't know how to make things secure, it's just that the workers in the civilian side of the government didn't really understand the threats and didn't prioritize security. Edit: Not to say everywhere in the non-civilian side of the government is secure. It isn't. Just that there are pockets of it that are better hardened that we could just wholesale copy.