3 ms·

Okay, forget this immortality thing, back to the original teletransporter. You step into a machine, it scans you at the subatomic level, and disassembles you in

Okay, forget this immortality thing, back to the original teletransporter. You step into a machine, it scans you at the subatomic level, and disassembles you into your atoms. Some distance away a second machine receives your scan and assembles some atoms accordingly. Alternatively your atoms also get shipped to the second machine and are put back into place there. Is the person coming out of the second machine you? If not, why? Some things to consider. You usually do not care about the exact atoms your body is made of, they get exchanged constantly. Even more dramatic changes like losing limbs, getting organs transplanted, or even replacing your heart with an artificial one do not change your identity. They will most likely affect your personality but they will not make you a fundamentally different person. Your consciousness is not uninterrupted, you lose it every time you fall asleep. You can even fall unconscious, get transported by an ambulance to a different place, get pieces of your body replaced, and wake up some time later in a hospital bed. You will most likely agree that you are still the same person. Sure, the teletransporter is more extrem in essentially every regard, but where is it fundamentally different so that the person stepping out of it is not the same person that stepped into it at the other end?

ASalazarMX 5y ago
I could lose consciousness and wake up without a limb and still be me, but take part of my brain and I might not notice it, but I won't be the same me anymore. I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. The problem with the transporter thought experiment is that we don't know if the arrangement of the atoms is enough to define a conscious mind. Is the mind state influenced by Earth's magnetic field or gravity well? Can we guarantee that we know enough about physics to capture the state of a colossal array of atoms and make sure nothing is lost? Imagine a weightless, indestructible, inelastic pole that connects Earth and the Moon. Can I pull and push on it and transmit information faster than light? Of course I could, but since such material can't exist, the question is useless.
- danbruc 5y ago
  I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. I agree with this, at least mostly. I argue one can make certain modifications without causing problems. Most people would probably agree that we can swap out an atom here or there, this already happens naturally anyway. And I see no upper limit for replacing pieces of the brain as long as the replacement is functionally equivalent. [...] we don't know if the arrangement of the atoms is enough to define a conscious mind. It does not matter, it is a thought experiment, we assume something and then think about the consequences of that assumption. So my description of the teletransporter is not to be understood literally, it will just do whatever is necessary to make it work. Sure, it is not impossible to make pointless thought experiments - assume X is true and X is false, what are the consequences - but in the case of the teletransporter I do not see why it matters for the discussion of person identity whether it is actually realizable. If we send not only the data but also the atoms over, then the teletransporter is in a certain sense a trivial device, going through the teletransporter is indistinguishable from you just walking from one device to the other, i.e. if we put the two devices onto a stage and hide them for some time behind the curtain, then the audience should be unable to figure out whether you used the teletransporter or whether you just walked over to the second device. If one wants to argue that a teleported person is not the same person afterwards, then - so it seems to me - one would either have to accept that walking also changes one person into another or one would have to explain why the details of how the person moved from A to B matters for person identity even though initial and final states are identical.

ASalazarMX 5y ago

I could lose consciousness and wake up without a limb and still be me, but take part of my brain and I might not notice it, but I won't be the same me anymore. I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. The problem with the transporter thought experiment is that we don't know if the arrangement of the atoms is enough to define a conscious mind. Is the mind state influenced by Earth's magnetic field or gravity well? Can we guarantee that we know enough about physics to capture the state of a colossal array of atoms and make sure nothing is lost? Imagine a weightless, indestructible, inelastic pole that connects Earth and the Moon. Can I pull and push on it and transmit information faster than light? Of course I could, but since such material can't exist, the question is useless.

danbruc 5y ago
I'm basically me as long as you don't take out thinking parts. I agree with this, at least mostly. I argue one can make certain modifications without causing problems. Most people would probably agree that we can swap out an atom here or there, this already happens naturally anyway. And I see no upper limit for replacing pieces of the brain as long as the replacement is functionally equivalent. [...] we don't know if the arrangement of the atoms is enough to define a conscious mind. It does not matter, it is a thought experiment, we assume something and then think about the consequences of that assumption. So my description of the teletransporter is not to be understood literally, it will just do whatever is necessary to make it work. Sure, it is not impossible to make pointless thought experiments - assume X is true and X is false, what are the consequences - but in the case of the teletransporter I do not see why it matters for the discussion of person identity whether it is actually realizable. If we send not only the data but also the atoms over, then the teletransporter is in a certain sense a trivial device, going through the teletransporter is indistinguishable from you just walking from one device to the other, i.e. if we put the two devices onto a stage and hide them for some time behind the curtain, then the audience should be unable to figure out whether you used the teletransporter or whether you just walked over to the second device. If one wants to argue that a teleported person is not the same person afterwards, then - so it seems to me - one would either have to accept that walking also changes one person into another or one would have to explain why the details of how the person moved from A to B matters for person identity even though initial and final states are identical.