4 ms·

Google does end-to-end encryption of Android backups. And Apple knows how to do it too, but they intentionally restricted their implementation to only cover bac

Google does end-to-end encryption of Android backups. And Apple knows how to do it too, but they intentionally restricted their implementation to only cover backups of Keychain passwords and a few other things, apparently because they don't have the courage to stand up to the FBI, according to Reuters. Strange considering their public stance against the FBI in the San Bernardino case and on privacy issues in general. Especially since iCloud backup totally defeats the highly touted end-to-end encryption in iMessage.

gjsman-1000 5y ago
Yes, backups, and Apple should get on that. However, your photos in Google Photos, your location data, your uploads in Google Drive (equivalent to iCloud Drive OP is talking about), not end to end encrypted and no option for it. I think market share is another sign. Does anyone use actual Android Backup, or do they use the unencrypted “backups” in G Photos and elsewhere? For that reason should the FBI care? Maybe I’m wrong but I believe actual Android Backup is much less used than iCloud and confusingly named alternative “backups” within Google apps.
- modeless 5y ago
  Look at the Reuters article they linked. iCloud backup is the issue. Usage of iCloud backup and Android backup are probably very similar (in percentage terms), why would you expect that Android backup is used less? They are pretty much equivalent features, except that one is end-to-end encrypted and the other is not. In both cases, photos are handled separately.
- headmelted 5y ago
  Let's be really frank about it - no large company is going to offer end-to-end encryption of photos because of what kind of photos might end up on their infrastructure if they do. And honestly I don't blame them at all. I'd just like to see Apple be more transparent with this one particular issue because it undermines so much of what they're advertising to the consumer. A transparency label for iCloud backup showing what is and is not E2E before enabling would do. Most people (myself included) would be quite happy with photos being encrypted by an Apple-held key (I'm not worried about the police seeing my boring lunch pics, I just don't want photos of my kids being readily accessible to everyone else). It should be made clear if they're offering E2E for some features that other settings will render it pointless is all I'm saying.
  - dannyw 5y ago
    Are you really arguing that because child pornography exists, no large company should offer ETE photos? Despite there been reasonable solutions like bloom filters and client sided hash detection, so that known child abuse material can be detected, without it needing to compromise the privacy of 99.99999% of users? And that photos present some of the most sensitive materials on your device: - geo-IP location showing basically everywhere you have taken a photo in, ever since the dawn of time - people's consensual sex tapes - photos of passwords, account recovery codes, private keys, seed words
    - vngzs 5y ago
      In the bloom filter example, what device calculates the hash inputs for the bloom filters? If it's the server, then the server needs a copy of the image to check. So is it the client? If so, how can you prevent a malicious client from forging their hashes to be those of known-safe images? Not saying it's not possible to build an E2E image storage service that also has the protections society tends to demand. Just saying that I haven't seen anyone do it yet, because these problems are subtle.
      - dannyw 5y ago
        Apple has direct-from-bootloader control over all of their hardware, unless you boot Linux on a Mac (in which case you don't get iCloud). So a 'malicious client' doesn't need to be part of the threat model here. And also, if you really stretch your argument, that's like saying we need to outlaw Linux and open source software because malicious actors can modify the code. The whole idea that society demands content providers compromise ETE just because of child pornography isn't something I've heard of being 'accepted as common truth' outside of this post. Some politicians demand it, but I thought at least amongst tech, there's the recognization that strong, *unbreakable* encryption is important. There's an implicit obligation to build services and technology that is resistant to abuse, but that isn't an argument to not implement ETE.
        vngzs 5y ago
- encryptluks2 5y ago
  There are encryption options, just not with the software provided by the storage providers.

gjsman-1000 5y ago

Yes, backups, and Apple should get on that. However, your photos in Google Photos, your location data, your uploads in Google Drive (equivalent to iCloud Drive OP is talking about), not end to end encrypted and no option for it. I think market share is another sign. Does anyone use actual Android Backup, or do they use the unencrypted “backups” in G Photos and elsewhere? For that reason should the FBI care? Maybe I’m wrong but I believe actual Android Backup is much less used than iCloud and confusingly named alternative “backups” within Google apps.

modeless 5y ago
Look at the Reuters article they linked. iCloud backup is the issue. Usage of iCloud backup and Android backup are probably very similar (in percentage terms), why would you expect that Android backup is used less? They are pretty much equivalent features, except that one is end-to-end encrypted and the other is not. In both cases, photos are handled separately.
headmelted 5y ago
Let's be really frank about it - no large company is going to offer end-to-end encryption of photos because of what kind of photos might end up on their infrastructure if they do. And honestly I don't blame them at all. I'd just like to see Apple be more transparent with this one particular issue because it undermines so much of what they're advertising to the consumer. A transparency label for iCloud backup showing what is and is not E2E before enabling would do. Most people (myself included) would be quite happy with photos being encrypted by an Apple-held key (I'm not worried about the police seeing my boring lunch pics, I just don't want photos of my kids being readily accessible to everyone else). It should be made clear if they're offering E2E for some features that other settings will render it pointless is all I'm saying.
- dannyw 5y ago
  Are you really arguing that because child pornography exists, no large company should offer ETE photos? Despite there been reasonable solutions like bloom filters and client sided hash detection, so that known child abuse material can be detected, without it needing to compromise the privacy of 99.99999% of users? And that photos present some of the most sensitive materials on your device: - geo-IP location showing basically everywhere you have taken a photo in, ever since the dawn of time - people's consensual sex tapes - photos of passwords, account recovery codes, private keys, seed words
  - vngzs 5y ago
    In the bloom filter example, what device calculates the hash inputs for the bloom filters? If it's the server, then the server needs a copy of the image to check. So is it the client? If so, how can you prevent a malicious client from forging their hashes to be those of known-safe images? Not saying it's not possible to build an E2E image storage service that also has the protections society tends to demand. Just saying that I haven't seen anyone do it yet, because these problems are subtle.
    - dannyw 5y ago
      Apple has direct-from-bootloader control over all of their hardware, unless you boot Linux on a Mac (in which case you don't get iCloud). So a 'malicious client' doesn't need to be part of the threat model here. And also, if you really stretch your argument, that's like saying we need to outlaw Linux and open source software because malicious actors can modify the code. The whole idea that society demands content providers compromise ETE just because of child pornography isn't something I've heard of being 'accepted as common truth' outside of this post. Some politicians demand it, but I thought at least amongst tech, there's the recognization that strong, *unbreakable* encryption is important. There's an implicit obligation to build services and technology that is resistant to abuse, but that isn't an argument to not implement ETE.
      - vngzs 5y ago
encryptluks2 5y ago
There are encryption options, just not with the software provided by the storage providers.