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This appears to actually go significantly beyond enforced password disclosure. From the text ( http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Gen_Scheme_of_AGS_(Powers)_Bill.pd

by cge 5y ago

This appears to actually go significantly beyond enforced password disclosure. From the text ( http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Gen_Scheme_of_AGS_(Powers)_Bill.pdf/Files/Gen_Scheme_of_AGS_(Powers)_Bill.pdf http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Gen_Scheme_of_AGS_(Powers)_Bil... ), on Head 16 (p 28): - An officer can use these requirements on anyone who "appears to him or her to have access". They don't appear to need any evidence beyond that. The person does not need to be a suspect or, it appears, the subject of a warrant, just a person present at the location subject to the search warrant. - It applies not just to access to information on the device, but information "which can be accessed by the use of that computer", and thus presumably includes information that is on other machine, or potentially not even in Ireland or the EU. - It allows officers to freely operate computers on site during a search (this seems like horrible forensic practice?), and use passwords found on the site to try to access any information accessible from the computer. - It does not just include disclosing passwords. It includes "any password or encryption key", and anything "to otherwise enable [the officer] to examine the information accessible by the computer". - It even appears that it allows officers to compel people not just to disclose passwords but to actually operate the device for them so as to enable information access, and "to produce the information in a form in which it can be removed". - It is not clear to me that there is any restriction on the scope of information, so long as it is in some way accessible. - Head 17 appears to allow even legally (or otherwise) privileged information to be seized, so long as "the confidentiality of the material can be maintained pending the determination by the court of the issue as to whether the material is privileged material". Combining these powers would seem to be able to result in ridiculous situations, for example, forcing a person to take data from a US server using an SSH key on their laptop, potentially violating US law by doing so, and for the person to do all the work necessary to do this themselves.

rapht 5y ago
I'd be interested in the reaction of all the folks who put their datacentres in Ireland (for tax or other purposes :p).
- topranks 5y ago
  Most of them are US based, where the concept isn’t unheard of: https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/security.png https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/security.png
advisedwang 5y ago
> It is not clear to me that there is any restriction on the scope of information Presumably the warrant defines the scope of the search. Of course the judges issuing the warrants aren't technical and generally cooperate with investigations, so I would expect vague and over-broad warrants to be the rule.
- cge 5y ago
  I'm not too familiar with Irish law, but the explanatory notes for Head 16 seem to suggest that the search warrants would be scoped by location, rather than topic.
bennyp101 5y ago
> - An officer can use these requirements on anyone who "appears to him or her to have access". They don't appear to need any evidence beyond that. The person does not need to be a suspect or, it appears, the subject of a warrant, just a person present at the location subject to the search warrant. Well that's handy then, the "helpful roomate" tries his best to enter the password, but didn't realise that after 3 wrong tries it wipes the device!
- cge 5y ago
  Yes, this legislation either seems to have been written by people who just want overly broad powers they'll use in a technically sound way, or by people who have no understanding of computer forensics. The way it's written makes it sound like the officers would be rifling through the computers and phones on site trying passwords they've found, themselves, or standing over the shoulder of people being forced to do so. It specifically talks about forcing someone to make information "visible and legible" and about copying documents, rather than just making forensically secure images of devices.
  - bjornjajayaja 5y ago
    They would probably have to bag the devices as evidence. But let’s be serious here it has to be at a place where a warrant is issued right? Tech folks are super paranoid. Like, try to make sure no warrants are out for you and your cousins and you should be fine. If you’re in the wrong place at the wrong time: sucks to be you anyway!
    - deleted 5y ago
      [deleted]
    - ipaddr 5y ago
      Like a store or tech conference or a city. Location is overly broad.
  - bennyp101 5y ago
    If so, it's a recipe for disaster. Easy enough to booby trap discreetly to delete things if not accessed the 'correct' way. Maybe this is to show that this approach is so crazy that it could never work (hence the written reports to gather data), and that they do actually need <insert some crazy power> here in order to do it properly because "we tried to do it the nice way and it didnt work"
dheera 5y ago
We need to invent hardware with biometric verification such that the device will not give access without the rightful owner present and operating it. Otherwise this will degenerate into police being allowed to sneeze devices and operate them away from their owner's presence. Make it possible to "lock in" a single biometric profile and not permit adding a second profile without automatically wiping all data.
- LatteLazy 5y ago
  We have those. But compelling a finger print is much easier than a password.
  - mLuby 5y ago
    Exactly. Biometrics are awful because 1. they can be compelled by force, 2. they can be physically collected, unbeknownst to the owner, 3. they share all the risks of digital passwords, including being leaked, 4. they can't ever be changed, even when known to be compromised by 1, 2, or 3. Much better to have 2+ passwords for deniable secrets. A unlocks the device. Most people only have this one "normal" password. B unlocks the device plus secret b, maybe some extra kinky porn so people feel they've found your real secret. C unlocks the device plus secret c, your real secret, maybe Bitcoin wallets or that novel you've been working on forever. If there's software on the device that does this, it's only evidence that 1+ secret dirs might exist. It should be impossible to tell that c exists, let alone compel its disclosure via C. But if b is quite stale, that's at least a hint that c might exist.
    - drvdevd 5y ago
      or even better ... a kernel backdoor to expose hidden encrypted filesystems and false physical disk size reporting, with a specific userspace trigger (eg: open the password manager, when this password is selected destroy the hidden filesystem(s); when this other app is opened and the phrase "X y Z" is typed, expose the hidden filesystem as a disk to userspace). You can go on forever with this stuff, especially if you have root on the device. Which gives you some clues about the true purpose of laws like this and who thinks they are useful.
lawn 5y ago
The police can also do fun stuff like force you to send all your Bitcoins to them. Without a warrant or evidence of any kind.
- gentleman11 5y ago
  I wonder if you could bend the wording as an excuse to seize somebody’s crypto assets for the duration of the investigation and after
  - dylan604 5y ago
    so that would make them a good target for ransomware with all of those extra coins. or just hack them to get access to wallets to transfer funds. they are cops after all, so it's doubtful their own OpSec would be very good. Password try 1 "back the blue", Password try 2 "respect my authority"
    - cwkoss 5y ago
      Horrifying thought, there are probably active duty cops in the US with the n-word in their password
      - Thiez 5y ago
        That actually sounds like a great way to lessen the temptation of sharing passwords.
    - MeinBlutIstBlau 5y ago
      Well for reference, I knew one guy I went to high school who did remedial classes all his life, then went on to college with a full basketball scholarship with some unbelievably easy business degree only to become a cop. This kid couldn't write a paper let alone a police report. Boggles my mind why they'd ever let someone like that be a cop. I guess they value people skills over knowing people have rights.
      - 5y ago
bjornjajayaja 5y ago
In theory though, this is no different than making someone “empty their pockets.” It’s just we happen to have information in our pockets. Folks, keep your information AT HOME where it belongs. Don’t dirty the streets with those ugly snaps no one wants to see (unless there’s a cat filter) :)
- Sebb767 5y ago
  > this is no different than making someone “empty their pockets.” Except they can take your key, search your house, take your work key from there and drive with your car to you workplace and search everything there you can access, as well. So metaphorically as well as actually (home server etc.), your home is not safe.
- MereInterest 5y ago
  In theory, there's a world of difference between the two. * Pockets may contain items that are dangerous to an arresting officer, or to other arrestees. Emptying pockets serves the purpose of removing that danger. Data stored on a phone are not dangerous to nearby people, and so there is no corresponding danger that needs to be removed. * Pockets can be verified to be empty, and so it can be verified that the person has complied with the order. There is no way to verify that all information accessible from a computer has been revealed. A police officer can demand that a suspect produce passwords that they don't have, then use the "noncompliance" as a way to add additional charges. * Emptied pockets can be returned to their original state. If my pockets contain a driver's license, $5 and lip balm, those items can be returned to me. If I reveal a password, the reveal of that password cannot be undone, and that account must be assumed to be compromised. * (For the US only) I have the enumerated right for my papers and effects to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. A full investigation of accounts to which I have access, done at the site of an arrest, by untrained officers, with no checks for data security, no limits on the breadth of the search, with no basis of reducing external harm, and no right to contest the disclosure until after it has occurred, is entirely unreasonable. I agree with your conclusions, that information security is important and should be more widely practiced. I disagree strongly with how you reached that conclusion, as a physical search of pockets is entirely unlike a search of one's phone or connected devices.
mysterydip 5y ago
I wonder what would happen in the event of a person working for a foreign government (diplomat, etc on assignment) being forced to log in to their govt laptop and access confidential info.
- Mauricebranagh 5y ago
  "I assert diplomatic immunity "
  - mysterydip 5y ago
    Can regular government workers do that, or just actual diplomats? If the latter, just go for their assistant.
    - 35fbe7d3d5b9 5y ago
      Under the Vienna Conventions, only people with diplomatic rank have full diplomatic immunity. Administrative and technical agents do have diplomatic immunity, but only for actions taken "in the course of their duties." But it wouldn't matter: documents and archives of the state are inviolable no matter where they are. And the property of a diplomatic mission must remain free of search and seizure.
      - coldacid 5y ago
        I can't wait for some Irish cop to start a massive diplomatic incident because some embassy worker happened to be in the wrong neighbourhood.
        repsilat 5y ago
        I think this is more likely to bite as it pertains to Ireland as a friendly business environment than it does to Ireland as a diplomatic partner.
        5y ago
xvector 5y ago
This is nuts.
- qwerty456127 5y ago
  I can't stop wondering why do the people of the UK and Ireland allow legislation like this to exist.
  - 1_player 5y ago
    Because in modern democracies it's not we the People writing laws. We vote someone with good enough promises and campaign, but when they're up there they pretty much do whatever they want. And voting for the other side doesn't make as much a difference as you'd think it will.
    - qwerty456127 5y ago
      This seemed a reasonable way to make sure decisions are made by competent people rather than the crowd. But today this seems becoming a scam.
bakedbeanz 5y ago
> It applies not just to access to information on the device, but information "which can be accessed by the use of that computer" So... basically the entire internet, then?
thanhhaimai 5y ago
The Arts of Confiscating Cryptocurrency, entry #7: - Stage a crime scene next door to the targeted machine. - Ask for a warrant for the location. - Knock on the door and ask the person to give the password for the Bitcoin.
- novok 5y ago
  - Know that someone has crypto in the first place.
merlincorey 5y ago
> - It even appears that it allows officers to compel people not just to disclose passwords but to actually operate the device for them so as to enable information access, and "to produce the information in a form in which it can be removed" I can see it now: "I'm sorry, Officer, but my company's Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy will not allow this document to be copied to any removable media or emailed outside of the company. I can make a request to Compliance for an exception but they take 7-10 days to respond!"
- pyuser583 5y ago
  In a form in which it can be removed? Like a printer?
Anthony-G 5y ago
Interestingly, the Irish Times coverage of this change in Irish law¹ has: > Security sources said the person refusing to surrender their password would have to be a suspect in a crime and trying to obstruct the investigation of that core offence before they would be convicted over the password refusal. It’s annoying that media coverage (by the “newspaper of record”) would rather cite speculation by anonymous sources rather than link directly to the text of the actual Bill. It’s only when I check the discussion on Hacker News that the source is directly referenced. On the other hand, the state broadcaster does not even deem this proposed change to Irish law to be newsworthy enough to warrant coverage on its news website². Somewhat Off Topic: The typesetting of the Bill itself is woeful and really impacts on readability of the text. It seems like the content was copied and pasted from multiple sources into MS Word without any consistent styling or indentation to reflect the hierarchy of bullet pointst. 1. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-garda-powers-to-allow-access-to-mobile-phones-changes-to-stop-and-search-1.4592434 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-garda-powe... 2. https://www.rte.ie/news/ https://www.rte.ie/news/

by cge 5y ago

rapht 5y ago

I'd be interested in the reaction of all the folks who put their datacentres in Ireland (for tax or other purposes :p).

topranks 5y ago
Most of them are US based, where the concept isn’t unheard of: https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/security.png https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/security.png

advisedwang 5y ago

> It is not clear to me that there is any restriction on the scope of information Presumably the warrant defines the scope of the search. Of course the judges issuing the warrants aren't technical and generally cooperate with investigations, so I would expect vague and over-broad warrants to be the rule.

cge 5y ago
I'm not too familiar with Irish law, but the explanatory notes for Head 16 seem to suggest that the search warrants would be scoped by location, rather than topic.

bennyp101 5y ago

> - An officer can use these requirements on anyone who "appears to him or her to have access". They don't appear to need any evidence beyond that. The person does not need to be a suspect or, it appears, the subject of a warrant, just a person present at the location subject to the search warrant. Well that's handy then, the "helpful roomate" tries his best to enter the password, but didn't realise that after 3 wrong tries it wipes the device!

cge 5y ago
Yes, this legislation either seems to have been written by people who just want overly broad powers they'll use in a technically sound way, or by people who have no understanding of computer forensics. The way it's written makes it sound like the officers would be rifling through the computers and phones on site trying passwords they've found, themselves, or standing over the shoulder of people being forced to do so. It specifically talks about forcing someone to make information "visible and legible" and about copying documents, rather than just making forensically secure images of devices.
- bjornjajayaja 5y ago
  They would probably have to bag the devices as evidence. But let’s be serious here it has to be at a place where a warrant is issued right? Tech folks are super paranoid. Like, try to make sure no warrants are out for you and your cousins and you should be fine. If you’re in the wrong place at the wrong time: sucks to be you anyway!
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
  - ipaddr 5y ago
    Like a store or tech conference or a city. Location is overly broad.
- bennyp101 5y ago
  If so, it's a recipe for disaster. Easy enough to booby trap discreetly to delete things if not accessed the 'correct' way. Maybe this is to show that this approach is so crazy that it could never work (hence the written reports to gather data), and that they do actually need <insert some crazy power> here in order to do it properly because "we tried to do it the nice way and it didnt work"

dheera 5y ago

We need to invent hardware with biometric verification such that the device will not give access without the rightful owner present and operating it. Otherwise this will degenerate into police being allowed to sneeze devices and operate them away from their owner's presence. Make it possible to "lock in" a single biometric profile and not permit adding a second profile without automatically wiping all data.

LatteLazy 5y ago
We have those. But compelling a finger print is much easier than a password.
- mLuby 5y ago
  Exactly. Biometrics are awful because 1. they can be compelled by force, 2. they can be physically collected, unbeknownst to the owner, 3. they share all the risks of digital passwords, including being leaked, 4. they can't ever be changed, even when known to be compromised by 1, 2, or 3. Much better to have 2+ passwords for deniable secrets. A unlocks the device. Most people only have this one "normal" password. B unlocks the device plus secret b, maybe some extra kinky porn so people feel they've found your real secret. C unlocks the device plus secret c, your real secret, maybe Bitcoin wallets or that novel you've been working on forever. If there's software on the device that does this, it's only evidence that 1+ secret dirs might exist. It should be impossible to tell that c exists, let alone compel its disclosure via C. But if b is quite stale, that's at least a hint that c might exist.
  - drvdevd 5y ago
    or even better ... a kernel backdoor to expose hidden encrypted filesystems and false physical disk size reporting, with a specific userspace trigger (eg: open the password manager, when this password is selected destroy the hidden filesystem(s); when this other app is opened and the phrase "X y Z" is typed, expose the hidden filesystem as a disk to userspace). You can go on forever with this stuff, especially if you have root on the device. Which gives you some clues about the true purpose of laws like this and who thinks they are useful.

lawn 5y ago

The police can also do fun stuff like force you to send all your Bitcoins to them. Without a warrant or evidence of any kind.

gentleman11 5y ago
I wonder if you could bend the wording as an excuse to seize somebody’s crypto assets for the duration of the investigation and after
- dylan604 5y ago
  so that would make them a good target for ransomware with all of those extra coins. or just hack them to get access to wallets to transfer funds. they are cops after all, so it's doubtful their own OpSec would be very good. Password try 1 "back the blue", Password try 2 "respect my authority"
  - cwkoss 5y ago
    Horrifying thought, there are probably active duty cops in the US with the n-word in their password
    - Thiez 5y ago
      That actually sounds like a great way to lessen the temptation of sharing passwords.
  - MeinBlutIstBlau 5y ago
    Well for reference, I knew one guy I went to high school who did remedial classes all his life, then went on to college with a full basketball scholarship with some unbelievably easy business degree only to become a cop. This kid couldn't write a paper let alone a police report. Boggles my mind why they'd ever let someone like that be a cop. I guess they value people skills over knowing people have rights.
    - 5y ago

bjornjajayaja 5y ago

In theory though, this is no different than making someone “empty their pockets.” It’s just we happen to have information in our pockets. Folks, keep your information AT HOME where it belongs. Don’t dirty the streets with those ugly snaps no one wants to see (unless there’s a cat filter) :)

Sebb767 5y ago
> this is no different than making someone “empty their pockets.” Except they can take your key, search your house, take your work key from there and drive with your car to you workplace and search everything there you can access, as well. So metaphorically as well as actually (home server etc.), your home is not safe.
MereInterest 5y ago
In theory, there's a world of difference between the two. * Pockets may contain items that are dangerous to an arresting officer, or to other arrestees. Emptying pockets serves the purpose of removing that danger. Data stored on a phone are not dangerous to nearby people, and so there is no corresponding danger that needs to be removed. * Pockets can be verified to be empty, and so it can be verified that the person has complied with the order. There is no way to verify that all information accessible from a computer has been revealed. A police officer can demand that a suspect produce passwords that they don't have, then use the "noncompliance" as a way to add additional charges. * Emptied pockets can be returned to their original state. If my pockets contain a driver's license, $5 and lip balm, those items can be returned to me. If I reveal a password, the reveal of that password cannot be undone, and that account must be assumed to be compromised. * (For the US only) I have the enumerated right for my papers and effects to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure. A full investigation of accounts to which I have access, done at the site of an arrest, by untrained officers, with no checks for data security, no limits on the breadth of the search, with no basis of reducing external harm, and no right to contest the disclosure until after it has occurred, is entirely unreasonable. I agree with your conclusions, that information security is important and should be more widely practiced. I disagree strongly with how you reached that conclusion, as a physical search of pockets is entirely unlike a search of one's phone or connected devices.

mysterydip 5y ago

I wonder what would happen in the event of a person working for a foreign government (diplomat, etc on assignment) being forced to log in to their govt laptop and access confidential info.

Mauricebranagh 5y ago
"I assert diplomatic immunity "
- mysterydip 5y ago
  Can regular government workers do that, or just actual diplomats? If the latter, just go for their assistant.
  - 35fbe7d3d5b9 5y ago
    Under the Vienna Conventions, only people with diplomatic rank have full diplomatic immunity. Administrative and technical agents do have diplomatic immunity, but only for actions taken "in the course of their duties." But it wouldn't matter: documents and archives of the state are inviolable no matter where they are. And the property of a diplomatic mission must remain free of search and seizure.
    - coldacid 5y ago
      I can't wait for some Irish cop to start a massive diplomatic incident because some embassy worker happened to be in the wrong neighbourhood.
      - repsilat 5y ago
        I think this is more likely to bite as it pertains to Ireland as a friendly business environment than it does to Ireland as a diplomatic partner.
        5y ago

xvector 5y ago

This is nuts.

qwerty456127 5y ago
I can't stop wondering why do the people of the UK and Ireland allow legislation like this to exist.
- 1_player 5y ago
  Because in modern democracies it's not we the People writing laws. We vote someone with good enough promises and campaign, but when they're up there they pretty much do whatever they want. And voting for the other side doesn't make as much a difference as you'd think it will.
  - qwerty456127 5y ago
    This seemed a reasonable way to make sure decisions are made by competent people rather than the crowd. But today this seems becoming a scam.

bakedbeanz 5y ago

> It applies not just to access to information on the device, but information "which can be accessed by the use of that computer" So... basically the entire internet, then?

thanhhaimai 5y ago

The Arts of Confiscating Cryptocurrency, entry #7: - Stage a crime scene next door to the targeted machine. - Ask for a warrant for the location. - Knock on the door and ask the person to give the password for the Bitcoin.

novok 5y ago
- Know that someone has crypto in the first place.

merlincorey 5y ago

> - It even appears that it allows officers to compel people not just to disclose passwords but to actually operate the device for them so as to enable information access, and "to produce the information in a form in which it can be removed" I can see it now: "I'm sorry, Officer, but my company's Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policy will not allow this document to be copied to any removable media or emailed outside of the company. I can make a request to Compliance for an exception but they take 7-10 days to respond!"

pyuser583 5y ago
In a form in which it can be removed? Like a printer?

Anthony-G 5y ago

Interestingly, the Irish Times coverage of this change in Irish law¹ has: > Security sources said the person refusing to surrender their password would have to be a suspect in a crime and trying to obstruct the investigation of that core offence before they would be convicted over the password refusal. It’s annoying that media coverage (by the “newspaper of record”) would rather cite speculation by anonymous sources rather than link directly to the text of the actual Bill. It’s only when I check the discussion on Hacker News that the source is directly referenced. On the other hand, the state broadcaster does not even deem this proposed change to Irish law to be newsworthy enough to warrant coverage on its news website². Somewhat Off Topic: The typesetting of the Bill itself is woeful and really impacts on readability of the text. It seems like the content was copied and pasted from multiple sources into MS Word without any consistent styling or indentation to reflect the hierarchy of bullet pointst. 1. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-garda-powers-to-allow-access-to-mobile-phones-changes-to-stop-and-search-1.4592434 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-garda-powe... 2. https://www.rte.ie/news/ https://www.rte.ie/news/