5 ms·
That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be r
by brigade 5y ago
That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be re-established and you lose nothing.
And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain.
- xvector 5y ago> And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain. This implies a really easy brute-force! I doubt this is the case!?
- brigade 5y agoYou get 10 tries and then it's wiped from the cloud. [1] Obviously this depends on you trusting that the HSMs function as Apple says they do and that it's their public key that you're additionally encrypting the keychain's key with. [2] [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for-icloud-keychain-sec3e341e75d/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for... [2] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keychain-recovery-secdeb202947/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keych...
- xvector 5y agoThis is kind of terrible as it relies on an authentication barrier as opposed to a cryptographic one. No one can reasonably call this E2EE. I really would have expected better security engineering from Apple, wow. Not that it matters, since barely anything of value is E2EE to begin with. Thanks for the sources.