4 ms·

+ my most sensitive service, Messages (if iCloud Messages is enabled)

xvector 5y ago
Messages in iCloud is E2EE, but if you enable iCloud backup it's not: > Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. [1] I love it how doesn't state that practically speaking, iCloud Backup is not E2EE. It seems Apple is afraid to be forthright the privacy implications of iCloud Backup. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- creato 5y ago
  How do you expect a service used by average joes to exist without Apple holding a key somewhere? For 99.99% of the users of iCloud, losing access to their data because they lost the key is going to be a problem for them before having their data subpoenaed by a secret warrant is a problem.
  - xvector 5y ago
    Social/multi-key recovery ala ADSS? Or make it so as long as you have a single device you can perform recovery? It is very unlikely that you'll lose all of your devices.
    - brigade 5y ago
      That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be re-established and you lose nothing. And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain.
      - xvector 5y ago
        > And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain. This implies a really easy brute-force! I doubt this is the case!?
        brigade 5y ago
        You get 10 tries and then it's wiped from the cloud. [1] Obviously this depends on you trusting that the HSMs function as Apple says they do and that it's their public key that you're additionally encrypting the keychain's key with. [2] [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for-icloud-keychain-sec3e341e75d/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for... [2] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keychain-recovery-secdeb202947/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keych...
        xvector 5y ago
        This is kind of terrible as it relies on an authentication barrier as opposed to a cryptographic one. No one can reasonably call this E2EE. I really would have expected better security engineering from Apple, wow. Not that it matters, since barely anything of value is E2EE to begin with. Thanks for the sources.
  - modeless 5y ago
    Like this: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h... TL;DR Android backups are end-to-end encrypted, but can still be restored to a new device without the involvement of the original device, using only the user's existing screen lock code and nothing else. Brute force attacks against the short screen lock code are prevented by secure elements in the datacenter. Apple could have done this too but they caved when the FBI told them not to. They thus retain the ability to read all of your data including supposedly "end-to-end" encrypted iMessages, unless you disable iCloud backups completely. And of course Apple tolerates no alternative cloud backup apps in their closed ecosystem so you're SOL if you want end-to-end encrypted cloud backups. I think this is shameful for a company that makes such a big deal about supposedly caring about your privacy.
  - matthewdgreen 5y ago
    A setting called “use end-to-end encryption for all backup data” hidden in a submenu, with appropriate warnings all over it to make sure average Joes don’t turn it on. (Hell, make people buy a developer account if you’re really worried.) The fact that Apple won’t allow e2e even as an advanced feature is pretty telling.

Messages in iCloud is E2EE, but if you enable iCloud backup it's not: > Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. [1] I love it how doesn't state that practically speaking, iCloud Backup is not E2EE. It seems Apple is afraid to be forthright the privacy implications of iCloud Backup. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303

creato 5y ago
How do you expect a service used by average joes to exist without Apple holding a key somewhere? For 99.99% of the users of iCloud, losing access to their data because they lost the key is going to be a problem for them before having their data subpoenaed by a secret warrant is a problem.
- xvector 5y ago
  Social/multi-key recovery ala ADSS? Or make it so as long as you have a single device you can perform recovery? It is very unlikely that you'll lose all of your devices.
  - brigade 5y ago
    That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be re-established and you lose nothing. And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain.
    - xvector 5y ago
      > And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain. This implies a really easy brute-force! I doubt this is the case!?
      - brigade 5y ago
        You get 10 tries and then it's wiped from the cloud. [1] Obviously this depends on you trusting that the HSMs function as Apple says they do and that it's their public key that you're additionally encrypting the keychain's key with. [2] [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for-icloud-keychain-sec3e341e75d/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/escrow-security-for... [2] https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keychain-recovery-secdeb202947/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-icloud-keych...
        xvector 5y ago
        This is kind of terrible as it relies on an authentication barrier as opposed to a cryptographic one. No one can reasonably call this E2EE. I really would have expected better security engineering from Apple, wow. Not that it matters, since barely anything of value is E2EE to begin with. Thanks for the sources.
- modeless 5y ago
  Like this: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h... TL;DR Android backups are end-to-end encrypted, but can still be restored to a new device without the involvement of the original device, using only the user's existing screen lock code and nothing else. Brute force attacks against the short screen lock code are prevented by secure elements in the datacenter. Apple could have done this too but they caved when the FBI told them not to. They thus retain the ability to read all of your data including supposedly "end-to-end" encrypted iMessages, unless you disable iCloud backups completely. And of course Apple tolerates no alternative cloud backup apps in their closed ecosystem so you're SOL if you want end-to-end encrypted cloud backups. I think this is shameful for a company that makes such a big deal about supposedly caring about your privacy.
- matthewdgreen 5y ago
  A setting called “use end-to-end encryption for all backup data” hidden in a submenu, with appropriate warnings all over it to make sure average Joes don’t turn it on. (Hell, make people buy a developer account if you’re really worried.) The fact that Apple won’t allow e2e even as an advanced feature is pretty telling.