7 ms·

The 300,000 warrantless secret gag orders issued by the FBI [1] are why we should be E2EEing all the things. Really disappointed that Apple held off implementin

The 300,000 warrantless secret gag orders issued by the FBI [1] are why we should be E2EEing all the things. Really disappointed that Apple held off implementing further E2EE in iCloud at the FBI's behest [2]. A lot of very personal data is not E2EE in iCloud [3]: - Calendars - Contacts - iCloud Drive - Notes - Photos - Reminders - Voice Memos - Mail This is honestly completely unacceptable. The current 'E2EE' is basically a farce - storing this data without E2EE in the cloud creates an extremely powerful state surveillance apparatus subject to gag orders. It is irrelevant that my Memoji are E2EE when my photos, notes, files, and calendars are not. Furthermore, the E2EE implementation might not even be true E2EE: > When a user enables iCloud Keychain for the first time, the device establishes a circle of trust and creates a syncing identity for itself. > When the user turns on iCloud Keychain on another device, iCloud Keychain notices that the user has a previously established syncing circle in iCloud that it isn’t a member of. The device creates its syncing identity key pair, then creates an application ticket to request membership in the circle. [4] It follows that Apple or a malicious actor can add an invisible device to the initial keyring server-side - a virtual 'zeroth device' - and 'approve' the user's very first device. It would receive everything added to iCloud Keychain. It isn't stated if the iCloud Devices list in Settings is a cryptographically verified list of all devices. Until Apple verifies that this is the case, we cannot reasonably call iCloud Keychain E2EE. [1]: https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters/faq https://www.eff.org/issues/national-security-letters/faq [2]: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv... [3]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 [4]: https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-keychain-syncing-sec0a319b35f/1/web/1 https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-keychain-syn...

schoolornot 5y ago
+ my most sensitive service, Messages (if iCloud Messages is enabled)
- xvector 5y ago
  Messages in iCloud is E2EE, but if you enable iCloud backup it's not: > Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. [1] I love it how doesn't state that practically speaking, iCloud Backup is not E2EE. It seems Apple is afraid to be forthright the privacy implications of iCloud Backup. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
  - creato 5y ago
    How do you expect a service used by average joes to exist without Apple holding a key somewhere? For 99.99% of the users of iCloud, losing access to their data because they lost the key is going to be a problem for them before having their data subpoenaed by a secret warrant is a problem.
    - xvector 5y ago
      Social/multi-key recovery ala ADSS? Or make it so as long as you have a single device you can perform recovery? It is very unlikely that you'll lose all of your devices.
      - brigade 5y ago
        That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be re-established and you lose nothing. And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain.
        xvector 5y ago
        > And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain. This implies a really easy brute-force! I doubt this is the case!?
Nitramp 5y ago
I'm skeptical whether E2EE is the right lever here. We've seen that a sufficiently motivated government will figure out a way - exploiting security holes, backdooring personal devices, all the way to physically tapping fiber cables. E2EE is the software engineer knee jerk technical solution, but you need to keep in mind you're dealing with an entity that has for all intents and purposes unlimited resources, long term motivation, the ability to force co-opt more or less everyone, and can amortize the cost over many cases. Which is to say: in the long run I'd bet on E2EE not working out. And that's not to speak of all the technical disadvantages and complexity of E2EE, e.g. around searchability. The right tool to solve this problem is (constitutional) law. We need to enshrine appropriate rights, and in a way that cannot be worked around with legal tricks. Also, maybe controversially, there are cases where I believe it's entirely legit for the government to seize communications (some subset of severe criminal cases), once approved by a proper judge, with due process. I'd rather live in a society where there's a defined process for this, with appropriate legal scrutiny over both process and the targets, then in a society where we attempt to fight the government and it's a constant arms race. Not having a process means certain motivated actors get to cry "somebody think of the children" and then throw all legal protections over board.
- xvector 5y ago
  I am speaking from the perspective that all governments are corrupt, and as history shows, all governments can and one day will betray the trust of their citizens. If we want to preserve our privacy, then solid cryptography is our best bet. On the software side we are eliminating entire classes of vulnerabilities with advancements like memory-safe languages and strong containerization. The government would end up burning all their zero days if they attempted surveillance on anywhere near the dystopian scale of today. I agree that these rights should be enshrined in law, but practical reality means that we have to take our privacy into our own hands.
  - Nitramp 5y ago
    > I am speaking from the perspective that all governments are corrupt, and as history shows, all governments can and one day will betray the trust of their citizens. I think it's worth being carefully about not falling into absolutes. Yes, some governments, or rather some sub-parts of some governments, are corrupt. Yes, over centuries expect things to go south. But existence proof that some government somewhere sometime was corrupt does not mean all are, and doesn't mean you can never trust rule of the law. > The government would end up burning all their zero days if they attempted surveillance [...] The government will buy a $5 wrench, https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/. The only thing that keeps the government from doing that already is the rule of law. Cryptography is a good protection from illegal actors, or from foreign powers etc; if you're fighting something that has immediate physical power over you, I believe the best bet is enforcing limits for the government in a democratic society.

schoolornot 5y ago

+ my most sensitive service, Messages (if iCloud Messages is enabled)

xvector 5y ago
Messages in iCloud is E2EE, but if you enable iCloud backup it's not: > Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages. [1] I love it how doesn't state that practically speaking, iCloud Backup is not E2EE. It seems Apple is afraid to be forthright the privacy implications of iCloud Backup. [1]: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
- creato 5y ago
  How do you expect a service used by average joes to exist without Apple holding a key somewhere? For 99.99% of the users of iCloud, losing access to their data because they lost the key is going to be a problem for them before having their data subpoenaed by a secret warrant is a problem.
  - xvector 5y ago
    Social/multi-key recovery ala ADSS? Or make it so as long as you have a single device you can perform recovery? It is very unlikely that you'll lose all of your devices.
    - brigade 5y ago
      That's half the point of the keychain syncing circle - even if you reset the iCloud account's password and kick every device out of the circle, it can then be re-established and you lose nothing. And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain.
      - xvector 5y ago
        > And even if you don't have access to any of your devices anymore, as long as you remember just one of their passcodes (and have access to the account's recovery phone number), you can still recover the keychain. This implies a really easy brute-force! I doubt this is the case!?

Nitramp 5y ago

I'm skeptical whether E2EE is the right lever here. We've seen that a sufficiently motivated government will figure out a way - exploiting security holes, backdooring personal devices, all the way to physically tapping fiber cables. E2EE is the software engineer knee jerk technical solution, but you need to keep in mind you're dealing with an entity that has for all intents and purposes unlimited resources, long term motivation, the ability to force co-opt more or less everyone, and can amortize the cost over many cases. Which is to say: in the long run I'd bet on E2EE not working out. And that's not to speak of all the technical disadvantages and complexity of E2EE, e.g. around searchability. The right tool to solve this problem is (constitutional) law. We need to enshrine appropriate rights, and in a way that cannot be worked around with legal tricks. Also, maybe controversially, there are cases where I believe it's entirely legit for the government to seize communications (some subset of severe criminal cases), once approved by a proper judge, with due process. I'd rather live in a society where there's a defined process for this, with appropriate legal scrutiny over both process and the targets, then in a society where we attempt to fight the government and it's a constant arms race. Not having a process means certain motivated actors get to cry "somebody think of the children" and then throw all legal protections over board.

xvector 5y ago
I am speaking from the perspective that all governments are corrupt, and as history shows, all governments can and one day will betray the trust of their citizens. If we want to preserve our privacy, then solid cryptography is our best bet. On the software side we are eliminating entire classes of vulnerabilities with advancements like memory-safe languages and strong containerization. The government would end up burning all their zero days if they attempted surveillance on anywhere near the dystopian scale of today. I agree that these rights should be enshrined in law, but practical reality means that we have to take our privacy into our own hands.
- Nitramp 5y ago
  > I am speaking from the perspective that all governments are corrupt, and as history shows, all governments can and one day will betray the trust of their citizens. I think it's worth being carefully about not falling into absolutes. Yes, some governments, or rather some sub-parts of some governments, are corrupt. Yes, over centuries expect things to go south. But existence proof that some government somewhere sometime was corrupt does not mean all are, and doesn't mean you can never trust rule of the law. > The government would end up burning all their zero days if they attempted surveillance [...] The government will buy a $5 wrench, https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/. The only thing that keeps the government from doing that already is the rule of law. Cryptography is a good protection from illegal actors, or from foreign powers etc; if you're fighting something that has immediate physical power over you, I believe the best bet is enforcing limits for the government in a democratic society.