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PoS security driven by market cap is like saying that the richer the top 1% is and the more they’ll be incentivized to protect their funds. It’s not necessarily
by baby 5y ago
PoS security driven by market cap is like saying that the richer the top 1% is and the more they’ll be incentivized to protect their funds. It’s not necessarily wrong, but it throws out a lot of other factors out the window. For example, who is this top 1% and how much do they care about the crypto.
- albntomat0 5y agoHonest question: How is that different from proof of work, where those with significant resources (1%, a nation, etc) can spend significantly on mining equipment?
- awaythrowact 5y agoMy understanding is, proof of stake is not more secure than proof of work. Reason for PoS are efficiency, speed of transaction, lower gas fees, less environmental impact, etc. (Of course there can be secure PoS, insecure PoS, secure PoW, insecure PoW…)
- yokem55 5y agoPolygon basically checkpoints a spreadsheet onto the eth chain on an interval, but there is no way to guarantee that there weren't any shenanigans between the checkpoints. This is a big improvement over say BSC which does no such thing, but it isn't the security of a true eth L2. Real L2's can prove that their output to L1 is legitimate either through zero knowledge cryptographic proofs (loopring, zksync) or through a game theory fraud check (optimism, arbitrum).
- baby 5y agoPoS is more secure in general, also PoS and BFT-based cryptocurrencies in periods of network partitions will rather come to a stop instead of allowing safety to be violated (double spending).
- jude- 5y agoOnce they stop, they don't start again without external intervention (so you're back to The DAO when it comes to which validators are not Byzantine). PoS is a bet that 1/3 of the staked tokens never, ever fall into the hands of Byzantine actors -- not by purchase, not by theft, and not by DeFi smart contract hacks. That's not a bet I would take.
- baby 5y agoThat’s not true, a good bft protocol will resume once network conditions stabilize.
- jude- 5y agoAnd how, exactly, will the "network conditions stabilize" if over 1/3 of the votes are malicious, and thus able to prevent the honest voters from ever agreeing on anything ever again? Are you betting that the attacker will just get bored and walk away? Also, what a confusing choice of words. A distributed system is BFT (or not BFT) regardless of whether or not the underlying message broadcast medium is synchronous/asynchronous, or reliable/unreliable. The "network conditions" being "stable" have no bearing on the voters' ability to reach agreement -- that's solely a function of whether or not f or fewer votes are malicious out of 3f + 1 votes.
- baby 5y agoI was talking about network conditions, not a threshold of malicious participants (in which case yeah you will have liveness issues). Your second paragraph is false also. Different BFT systems have different assumptions. Some work in asynchronous settings, some work in semi-synchronous settings, etc.
- jude- 5y agoYou should consider rereading Leslie Lamport's original paper. BFT is a property of corrupt votes, not the network. You keep trying to make it about the network. Like, if you want to have a conversation about how the network can influence the system's fault tolerance, you should instead consider the network topology -- as in, which routes between honest nodes include corrupt nodes. This is also considered by the paper, since corrupt nodes can censor or rewrite messages, and thus influence how many corrupt nodes the system can truly tolerate, given a network topology. But in no case does message delay give a BFT system's node an excuse to make forward progress without first verifying that at least 2f+1 replicas agree with its decision. Even voting on a view change to remove a presumed dead node requires a 2f+1 vote.
- rawtxapp 5y agoWhatever equipment you buy will lose it's value quickly, in 5+ years, it's probably worthless. And that's ignoring all the money you have to spend on electricity, non-stop and increasingly. In PoW, if miners slow down, they'll become irrelevant. Even if you manage to acquire a 51% hash rate for example (which is extremely difficult), it'll be very difficult to keep it over a long enough period of time. PoS is fundamentally broken in my opinion, it literally says "rich gets richer" and wealthy stakers will get higher (absolute) rewards which they don't have any incentive to sell since they didn't spend any energy to get it. That's even ignoring all the custodians which have large quantities of the said crypto, so they can just keep the rewards to themselves or keep a sizeable % of it. One of the motivations for the DAO hack hardfork btw was that the attacker would hold significant power under a PoS system.
- hanniabu 5y agoSo in other words only the rich can mine
- rawtxapp 5y agoYou can participate in mining pools, but realistically speaking unless you have very powerful hardware, you're better off just buying Bitcoin outright. Same with PoS, you can stake with a pool if you have less than 32eth, but your returns on that are not going to be comparable to what large holders get (same percentage, but very tiny in absolute numbers).
- wmf 5y agoYou're arguing that "small" (<$80K) amounts of money aren't worth investing even at a very high APR. This is pretty contrary to most investment advice.
- rawtxapp 5y agoI'm not, even small amounts should be invested of course, I'm just pointing out that rich benefit the most in either scenario. Also worth pointing out, high APRs aren't guaranteed and the network fees are supposed to be significantly decreased post EIP-1559. Also, for those who don't meet 32 eth threshold, there's good chance they are not even remotely close to that threshold.
- baby 5y agoBasically in proof of work you have no idea who is participating at any moment. For example, the NSA could be running a blockchain in parallel and if they have more power create a fork. With proof of stake you are always aware of the participants in the system and a fork will only happen it the richest decide to fork. But why would they? In Bitcoin the most powerful miner might have no bitcoin and no incentive to keep the network safe. At the same time, because of this, you don’t really get finality in Bitcoin. You get some assurance that your transaction is “confirmed” after a number of block but you’re never really sure. In proof of stake you can have consensus protocols with true finality, meaning that there’ll be no forks for sure if a threshold of participants remained honest.
- Ericson2314 5y agoIt's not! Except on wastes far more electricity. We cannot an-cap our way to a classless society anyways, people. PoS is unquestionably the lesser evil of the two.
- keymone 5y agoThe difference is that PoW is permissionless and PoS is permissioned system. Another difference is that in PoS you pay once and get benefits forever, in PoW you must actively choose to spend energy mining. One more difference is that once you become a staker, your power in the system only grows, in PoW anybody can start mining and dilute your power. PoS is simply worse from every angle and it’s also not cheaper because MR=MC.
- s7atic 5y ago> The difference is that PoW is permissionless and PoS is permissioned system. This is a big statement without an argument to back it up. > PoS is simply worse from every angle and it’s also not cheaper because MR=MC. The difference is that MC in PoS is mainly interest costs, while in PoW it's energy and hardware.
- keymone 5y agoPoS is permissioned system because if you want to become a validator you must convince another (potential) validator to give up part of his stake. > MC in PoS is mainly interest costs no, it's also costs of fighting (via politics, marketing and hacking) for that initial pre-mined stake. it's not cheaper than PoW and has worse security properties due to all sorts of attacks - long range, grinding, etc. ultimately it's flawed because unlike in PoW there is no universally objective measure of geniuneness of a chain (the "work" in PoW).
- CryptoPunk 5y agoPoS is effectively permissionless given the number of parties that have the stakeable asset and are willing to sell it. >>no, it's also costs of fighting (via politics, marketing and hacking) for that initial pre-mined stake. There is no fight if there was a transition from PoW to PoS, and thus no premine, or if the premine was distributed via an open crowdsale, with revenue allocated to a non-profit foundation. Your analysis makes too many tenuous assumptions to push one side of the debate.
- eyezick 5y agoI wouldn't say PoS security has to be driven by the rich, but by whoever is staking, which people could be staking small like lets say 1 ETH total. The security is derived simply by the threat of having your staked ETH (however much) slashed away.
- keymone 5y agoNothing is slashed if attacker doesn’t publish the alternative chain until they have successful attack. PoS is absolutely driven by rich and helps rich get richer faster than everybody else. If I get 10% stake - I get 10% of any future issuance, meaning my stake can never go below 10%, so my power in the system never dilutes even though I literally don’t have to do anything anymore. Miners in PoW have to participate in mining and their power can get diluted by anyone by simply getting more hardware online. PoS doesn’t work.
- casi 5y agoThat isn’t how it works. There isn’t a cap on validators so you can’t buy up a fixed percentage of the network. More people can always join. You will be diluted over time unless you choose to reinvest(same as mining). As we reduce the hardware costs and energy usage costs it becomes easier to participate in the network (especially via pools, same as mining but much much cheaper). Being able to run a validator on a solar powered raspberry pi is a great improvement to making participation in the network accessible. We should see the exact opposite of what you suggest, anyone who wants to participate not having energy or hardware restrictions should make it less Matthew-effect-like. PoS increases both the cost of a direct attack on the network as reorganised/51s are more expensive to perform with slashing mechanisms in place, and also removes the threats of supply line disruption by either nation states or cartels forming to control the flow of the hardware. PoS is great.
- keymone 5y ago> There isn’t a cap on validators so you can’t buy up a fixed percentage of the network you can during a pre-sale or pre-mine event > More people can always join joininng as validator means convincing another validator to reduce their stake (sell it to you), which is a form of permission. > You will be diluted over time unless you choose to reinvest you can't be diluted if you don't sell you stake and continue staking. that's just by definition how PoS works. > PoS increases both the cost of a direct attack on the network as reorganised/51s are more expensive to perform with slashing mechanisms in place, and also removes the threats of supply line disruption by either nation states or cartels forming to control the flow of the hardware. nope, literally none of it is true. slashing mechanisms only obfuscate the attack, they don't make it more expensive. in fact they reduce security by virtue of piling more and more rules that require more and more code, which inevitably contains bugs. threats of supply chain attacks are much less scary than threats of long range attacks from hacked / overtaken private keys of early / current validators. producing more hardware to counter an attack might be expensive and early iterations of hardware can be inefficient, but at least nobody can stop you from producing it. as i've already explained - if somebody gets a stake in pos system, there is nothing you can do to reduce it. pos simply doesn't work. it's been known a decade before pow and was just never considered seriously because it's not trustless and permissionless.