"Detailed. But wrong...The government cannot prove that the laptop is hers." I wrote, "the fact that a password works on a particular machine may be incriminat

"Detailed. But wrong...The government cannot prove that the laptop is hers." I wrote, "the fact that a password works on a particular machine may be incriminating. This is the only line of argument that could work...it could...prove that they did have possession or knowledge of the drive." Seems like we're saying the same thing. At issue here is likely the status of what constitutes a "Foregone Conclusion". In Fisher, the courts established that, "The existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information by conceding that he in fact has the papers. Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons 'no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.'" In Boucher there's clearly not a foregone conclusion, and the motion to quash the grand jury subpoena was upheld because the password's production was "purely testimonial." Here, it might not be "purely testimonial." Also, for what it's worth: having a password is certainly better than locking a system via biometrics. At least with a password, the law is (currently) indeterminate. Biometric locks: you're screwed.