5 ms·

Is this a joke? Just leave the extra second on. Any release of software has a risk associated with it so you shouldn't risk it unless the update is worth the r

by billpg 5y ago

Is this a joke? Just leave the extra second on. Any release of software has a risk associated with it so you shouldn't risk it unless the update is worth the risk. The time they spent investigating and updating is time wasted. Anything else they could have done would have been a better use of that time. The time I spent writing this comment was a better use of time. And this comment is really not important.

Sebguer 5y ago
This is not the approach you can take to writing software that the security of the entire internet relies upon.
anyfoo 5y ago
You'd be surprised how often something that does not seem like a big deal is some kind of deal after all, sometimes even a big one. Software is complex. So far, all signs point to this not being a big deal (EDIT: from the software side), but that is contingent on the aforementioned investigation. Others have also mentioned how it is a matter of principle: Certificates were misissued, where do you draw the line if not at that general fact?
- NovemberWhiskey 5y ago
  This isn't a software complexity issue; the only reason we're talking about this is the sensitivity of root trust store process. CAs are required to issue Certificate Practice Statements (CPS) which tell the world-at-large the parameters under which they issue certificates. Here's the CPS for Let's Encrypt that was in effect when this problem was detected: https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.2/ https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.2/ These CPSs are used by the various browser/operating system developers to make decisions about which CAs should be included in their root trust stores; i.e. basically whether you're a CA accepted by "the internet". Let's Encrypt's CPS said one thing (we issue certificates valid for 90 days), but their implementation did a different thing (issued certificates valid for 90 days + 1 second). An inability to adhere to your CPS is a big deal - it is effectively an internal controls failure; and self-reporting of failures to adhere to your CPS is essential. The owners of the root trust stores are going to want to see seriousness from the CAs when it comes to adherence to their CPS, even in apparently de minimis cases. e.g. refer to Mozilla's policy guide and its reliance on the CA CPS: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu... No-one is suggesting that a one second difference in validity makes any difference in the real world, and Let's Encrypt has already uprev'd their CPS to make it clear that actually all they promise is that certificates will be valid "less than 100 days": https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.3/ https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.3/
  - anyfoo 5y ago
    Thanks, I understand, but I wanted to address a broader point about software, which the comment I replied to talked about. To repeat: Sometimes software, or things that interact with software (which is minimally what this is), has issues that may seem small, but end up big because of complexity. This turned out not to be one of them. But it would be a consideration in an investigation, even though (or so I guess) it was likely straightforward to dismiss it quickly in this particular case. Nevertheless, the time to investigate potential repercussions of something so critical is not "wasted". I updated my comment above to clarify that this does not seem to be a big deal so far from the software side.
  - kps 5y ago
    It does literally say ‘90 days’. Pedantically, if that's read as a physical measurement, it's precise to plus or minus half a day, which more than covers the actual state. Perhaps Mozilla also erred in accepting a statement that said ‘90 days’ rather than ‘7776000 seconds’.
    - zaarn 5y ago
      The X.509 RFC and it's relevant substandards define a day to be 86400 seconds long. Not longer, not shorter. There is no half a day tolerance in there, only tolerance of less than a second (which LE exceeded by hitting an entire second).
  - corroclaro 5y ago
    This is yet another nail in why we need to get rid of the whole accursed trusted CA+Browser disaster.
suprfsat 5y ago
Previously: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20573429 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20573429 Serial numbers that should have 64 bits of randomness only had 63.
- billpg 5y ago
  Each bit doubles the range of values. If the error was that certs were issued for 180 days instead of 90, I'd agree that's a problem.

by billpg 5y ago

Sebguer 5y ago

This is not the approach you can take to writing software that the security of the entire internet relies upon.

anyfoo 5y ago

You'd be surprised how often something that does not seem like a big deal is some kind of deal after all, sometimes even a big one. Software is complex. So far, all signs point to this not being a big deal (EDIT: from the software side), but that is contingent on the aforementioned investigation. Others have also mentioned how it is a matter of principle: Certificates were misissued, where do you draw the line if not at that general fact?

NovemberWhiskey 5y ago
This isn't a software complexity issue; the only reason we're talking about this is the sensitivity of root trust store process. CAs are required to issue Certificate Practice Statements (CPS) which tell the world-at-large the parameters under which they issue certificates. Here's the CPS for Let's Encrypt that was in effect when this problem was detected: https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.2/ https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.2/ These CPSs are used by the various browser/operating system developers to make decisions about which CAs should be included in their root trust stores; i.e. basically whether you're a CA accepted by "the internet". Let's Encrypt's CPS said one thing (we issue certificates valid for 90 days), but their implementation did a different thing (issued certificates valid for 90 days + 1 second). An inability to adhere to your CPS is a big deal - it is effectively an internal controls failure; and self-reporting of failures to adhere to your CPS is essential. The owners of the root trust stores are going to want to see seriousness from the CAs when it comes to adherence to their CPS, even in apparently de minimis cases. e.g. refer to Mozilla's policy guide and its reliance on the CA CPS: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu... No-one is suggesting that a one second difference in validity makes any difference in the real world, and Let's Encrypt has already uprev'd their CPS to make it clear that actually all they promise is that certificates will be valid "less than 100 days": https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.3/ https://letsencrypt.org/documents/isrg-cps-v3.3/
- anyfoo 5y ago
  Thanks, I understand, but I wanted to address a broader point about software, which the comment I replied to talked about. To repeat: Sometimes software, or things that interact with software (which is minimally what this is), has issues that may seem small, but end up big because of complexity. This turned out not to be one of them. But it would be a consideration in an investigation, even though (or so I guess) it was likely straightforward to dismiss it quickly in this particular case. Nevertheless, the time to investigate potential repercussions of something so critical is not "wasted". I updated my comment above to clarify that this does not seem to be a big deal so far from the software side.
- kps 5y ago
  It does literally say ‘90 days’. Pedantically, if that's read as a physical measurement, it's precise to plus or minus half a day, which more than covers the actual state. Perhaps Mozilla also erred in accepting a statement that said ‘90 days’ rather than ‘7776000 seconds’.
  - zaarn 5y ago
    The X.509 RFC and it's relevant substandards define a day to be 86400 seconds long. Not longer, not shorter. There is no half a day tolerance in there, only tolerance of less than a second (which LE exceeded by hitting an entire second).
- corroclaro 5y ago
  This is yet another nail in why we need to get rid of the whole accursed trusted CA+Browser disaster.

suprfsat 5y ago

Previously: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20573429 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20573429 Serial numbers that should have 64 bits of randomness only had 63.

billpg 5y ago
Each bit doubles the range of values. If the error was that certs were issued for 180 days instead of 90, I'd agree that's a problem.