4 ms·
This is a "no brown M&Ms" kind of violation. The direct impact of this violation is basically nil. However, it's a violation that suggests that the requirements
by jcranmer 5y ago
This is a "no brown M&Ms" kind of violation. The direct impact of this violation is basically nil. However, it's a violation that suggests that the requirements haven't been very carefully read and that conformance to them hasn't been very carefully audited. So how can you have be assured that there aren't violations of more important rules still lurking about?
- teraflop 5y agoThere was a similar issue a while back, where an open-source system used by a number of CAs was by default configured to generate serial numbers with only 63 bits of entropy, when the CA/B forum rules require 64 bits: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/03/cas_reissue_ove.html https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2019/03/cas_reissue_o... This incident was complicated by the fact that it was first noticed while investigating a particular CA (DarkMatter) that was already suspected of various shady activities. Most of the other affected organizations took the incident seriously, fixed the problem and revoked the affected certificates, as required by the letter of the rules, even though the actual risk was small. DarkMatter chose to spend a lot of time complaining and making weaselly arguments on the mailing list (like "a 64-bit number where the leading bit is always zero is still technically a 64-bit random number") which did not do much to convince anyone of their trustworthiness.
- andrewmunsell 5y agoIn case anyone is confused, I believe the reference to "no brown M&Ms" is a reference to Van Halen's contracts: https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/brown-out/ https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/brown-out/ > So, when I would walk backstage, if I saw a brown M&M in that bowl … well, line-check the entire production. Guaranteed you’re going to arrive at a technical error. They didn’t read the contract. Guaranteed you’d run into a problem. Sometimes it would threaten to just destroy the whole show. Something like, literally, life-threatening.
- cpeterso 5y agoDid Van Halen ever actually cancel any shows because of brown M&Ms? The Snopes article says David Lee Roth found a brown M&M, but the show proceeded (and technical problems caused damage to the venue floor). "I found some brown M&M’s, I went into full Shakespearean “What is this before me?” … you know, with the skull in one hand … and promptly trashed the dressing room. Dumped the buffet, kicked a hole in the door, twelve thousand dollars’ worth of fun. The staging sank through their floor. They didn’t bother to look at the weight requirements or anything, and this sank through their new flooring and did eighty thousand dollars’ worth of damage to the arena floor. The whole thing had to be replaced.
- jjeaff 5y agoVandalism and destruction of property is a crime, even if you say you will pay for it. I guess if you are rich or famous enough, everyone just let's everything slide.
- ceejayoz 5y agoUnless, of course, said destruction of property is in said contract. Otherwise, "smash therapy" places couldn't exist. If I were writing contracts for rock stars, I'd probably look to account for tantrums and raging parties in the wording.
- travisjungroth 5y agoThere's something I don't get about that method, as clever as it sounds. The method is if there are brown M&Ms, then check the entire production for safety. What about the else? Don't check everything? So if the person in charge of the green room happens to be on top of things and picks out a few M&Ms, they don't line-check the entire production even though there could be something "literally life-threatening"? It's easy to say that the brown M&Ms acted as a signal, but I can't think of any way to depend on that signal that isn't reckless. Just check the actual production, since that seems to be an option.
- hallway_monitor 5y agoIf we were designing a critical system around this, I suppose I would create several unrelated triggers that, if found, would invoke an extra-detailed review of all work in the show.
- hashkb 5y agoThe baseline assumption is that they read your contract and do everything. It's their job to get it right. If they're attentive to the stupidest thing in your contract, they probably did an OK job on everything else. Sure, it's still possible to be electrocuted during the show even if the M&M's were right. But, rock stars are not going to arrive early every night just to stay alive. The buck has to stop somewhere, and EVH decided it was in the bowl of M&M's.
- jjeaff 5y agoI don't buy that this trick would be effective, though I like the sentiment. I would guess that the detail of m&m color could very often be overlooked due to its insignificance and create a false signal. For one, the same people in charge of safety like riggings and electrical are not going to be the same people that are supplying the refreshments. I can also imagine a high number of people like myself reading that part and think it's a joke or purposely ignoring it because there are much more important issues to deal with and because I'm not much into indulging the ridiculous whims of self important people.
- LeifCarrotson 5y agoOn reading the explanation: > The Zlint project only attempts to check whether a certificate exceeds the maximum validity allowed by the baseline requirements [398 days], and is not configurable. To extend the 'no brown M&Ms' analogy, this would be like Van Halen learning the caterer was only checking for FDA safety requirements and not their specific needs. It's good that it's food safe, and a brown M&M (or one with a fleck of brown exposed) isn't going to hurt anyone, but it means that you've got a breakdown in your process. Specifically, Let's Encrypt needs a review of their linting process. The requirement was that the lifetime be set to 7775999 seconds, or 90 days, this particular tool may not have thrown an error if the time had been 180 days or 360 days, and instead only thrown an error at 399 days. One second is not a problem, but 300 days would be a problem for sure! How were the lints which they're running selected, in particular how was the rule 'e_tls_server_cert_valid_time_longer_than_398_days' accepted, knowing that their validity was shorter than that? Are there other rules where the linter is checking against the most liberal specs but Let's Encrypt is offering something more precise? Fuzzing against a validity clock of 7775998 seconds, 7775999 seconds, and 7776000 seconds would find this issue, are there any other parameters that can be fuzzed? Questions like this need to be asked.
- teachingassist 5y ago> This is a "no brown M&Ms" kind of violation. I see it more as a "no brwn M&Ms" violation. We would all assume the intent was to say no brown M&Ms, rather than imagine that no action was required.