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I've never seen a realistic threat model where Signal-style forward secrecy actually helps. Suppose a repressive regime captured one dissident can see a bunch o
by lmm 5y ago
I've never seen a realistic threat model where Signal-style forward secrecy actually helps. Suppose a repressive regime captured one dissident can see a bunch of messages between them and other people, but theoretically some crypto nerd might have been able to forge those messages if the dissident has been carefully publishing the material they're supposed to publish and the cryptographer decided to run the forgery toolkit on them and then somehow inject the forged messages onto the arrested guy's device. Do you think that's going to stop the regime from pulling in all the apparent recipients of those messages?
- schoen 5y agoI'm pretty you're thinking of deniability (from OTR) rather than forward secrecy. The forward secrecy in protocols like Signal allows for things like disappearing messages, which are then actually technically credible (the sender's and recipient's devices literally don't contain any information which would help to reconstruct the contents of their old messages). I think the former isn't really helpful in your scenario, but the latter is.
- lmm 5y agoYou're absolutely right. Still, I'd ask the same question about forward secrecy: is there a realistic model where they actually help? My impression is that people would generally keep their chat logs for as long as they're relevant, and so a message can only ever become unrecoverable by an attacker once it's irrelevant, in which case it's likely to also be irrelevant to an attacker. I guess maybe there are cases where someone is picked up and it's found they were also involved in some otherwise successful action years before?