3 ms·
Not quite. Only in "red state", which is a subset of debug mode. So, even more restrictive than what you said. But I still don't think that makes it clickbai
by AnimalMuppet 5y ago
Not quite. Only in "red state", which is a subset of debug mode. So, even more restrictive than what you said.
But I still don't think that makes it clickbait. From the article:
> The three researchers have posted a video demonstrating how to access the two instructions with only root/admin privileges. This requires uploading a custom UEFI to SPI flash and then rebooting the system, which definitely requires having physical access to it.
So, not remote-able (at the moment). But there's enough there that I can't agree with calling it clickbait.
- fouric 5y agoEven aside from security vulnerabilities, wouldn't the ability to write your own microcode for Intel CPUs be interesting for many hobbyists?
- quotemstr 5y agoRight. Writing custom microcode can be useful for understanding fine details of the CPU's microarchitecture, which in turn is useful for things ranging from low-level optimization to discovering microarchitectural vulnerabilities that don't require custom microcode to exploit.
- yxhuvud 5y agoOr you can treat your Intel processor as a fpga and write instructions that do what you want them to. Unlocking features locked down to higher end machines is also not off the table. So it may or not be a security issue but it makes the machine hackable in a way it hasn't been before.
- rolph 5y agoshould you be capable enough to write your own microcode, there is an elevated chance that you could also encrypt and sign that code like intel microcode.
- marcan_42 5y agoNot unless you break RSA, which would be much more of an accomplishment than working out how microcode works.
- AnimalMuppet 5y agoFrom the article: > As a matter of fact, several vulnerabilities in Intel ME have been discovered in the past. Among others, Ermolov, Sklyarov, and Goryachy described a method to extract the secret key that is used inside the CPU to decrypt microcode updates, which also led to the possibility of executing your own microcode on the CPU or reading Intel's microcode. So you don't have to break RSA. You just have to use the private key to derive the public key, which I believe is do-able.
- spockz 5y agoEncryption and signing are two different things both using rsa keys. The public key used for encryption does not need to be part of the same key pair as the private key used for signing. Not sure whether this is the case here.
- SAI_Peregrinus 5y agoAlso they talk about a secret key, not a private key. That means it's likely using symmetric key encryption, with RSA for signing (and maybe to update the symmetric key a la RSA-KEM). This is normal, nobody does direct asymmetric message encryption.
- phire 5y agoIf the attacker is flashing custom ME firmware to flash, you are already well and truly fucked. They already have persistent and unlimited access to the ultimate back door and modifying the microcode isn't going to get them any extra access to your data or programs.
- AnimalMuppet 5y agoAt a minimum, though, this would be harder to detect. All of the usual places to look are completely unpatched.
- phire 5y agoBut it's not persistent by itself. You are going to need both a persistent modified ME firmware to enable red mode and some x86 code do the actual microcode modification on each boot. If the attacker has that, they can already do a traditional VM rootkit to hide their modifications.
- fulafel 5y agoA publicly documented cheap and reliable way to backdoor the cpu would bring this ME vector to many more people's radars.
- michaelmrose 5y ago> This requires uploading a custom UEFI to SPI flash and then rebooting the system, which definitely requires having physical access to it. Does this require something other than writing the file to the UEFI partition, setting it as the next boot target, and rebooting into that boot target? I tend to think I misunderstand because that would require root privileges under Linux but not physical access.