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A safety override in the military is a safety feature in itself. In battle, overriding a safety feature might be the difference between returning fire and savi

• touisteur 5y ago
  Yes, I see. What I mean is that in civilian systems I designed (or helped design) the focus is on redundancy, safety and personel safety. I've felt for a long time the 'for the military' design was quick to forgo redundancies and failsafes, for better 'performance' (my vocabulary is lacking there, sorry). The mentality is changing a lot and I'm starting to see safety requirements in contracts and more and more frequent audits from customers on the topic (even though it wasn't in the spirit of things or the contract when system was designed, ugh...) and it's very, very hard to retrofit safety and personel safety in a product line, codebase, system design, and especially in the daily reflexes of systems or sw engineers. Everyone seems to overshoot ("safety says we must do X" - well no it's still an engineering compromise you still have choices and trade-offs - "but safety!" - yes, let's go back to the safety plan, what are the critical elements, what are the failure modes, what are the chances, what is the expected system response?...) It's particularly tough for those teams that have to swallow the double firehose of safety and "cyber"-security :-D