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By E2E you mean SSL and not actually end-to-end right? AFAIK no provider transports HTTP packets over the wire E2E in the same way that Signal or Telegram trans

By E2E you mean SSL and not actually end-to-end right? AFAIK no provider transports HTTP packets over the wire E2E in the same way that Signal or Telegram transports text messages E2E. It's not actually possible since there is no way to transmit a shared secret without first establishing a secure channel (which itself cannot be E2E). Anyways point being, China/HK could just subpoena the private keys for individual SSL certificates and decrypt traffic on their end while it passes through the pipeline. Having sovereignty over the cable is still an advantage for them.

vitus 5y ago
I mean e2e as far as the connection is concerned, whether it's a server talking to end-users via HTTPS, or a server in a datacenter in Singapore talking to a server in a datacenter in Atlanta using GPG or TLS or whichever proprietary encryption algorithm you want to use. If China / HKG has that subpoena power for arbitrary SSL certificates, then we've already lost. As I mentioned, significant traffic already transits through HKG. But even so, what enforcement mechanism does China have? Facebook as well as many other services are already blocked... And honestly, if China starts using subpoena power to take control of SSL certs, that's a _very_ strong incentive to leave that market entirely, as not only can they decrypt your traffic; they can also impersonate you. "True e2e" as offered by Signal / Telecom still relies on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and therefore some notion of public / private keys with custom PKI servers. It's no different from an attacker's perspective -- instead of the global PKI infra underpinning the web, you're just dealing with a single entity. Compromise the PKI, and you can MitM to your heart's content.
- nexuist 5y ago
  Fair point. I was under the assumption that subpoenaing certs at least for domestic entities was common place. I guess that barrier hasn't been crossed yet, or at least we assume so?
  - vitus 5y ago
    After some amount of poking around, I've found exactly one case where that happened (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit in connection with Snowden). Law enforcement might subpoena, say, search result records in connection with a specific crime (certain keywords + location + timeframe), but larger companies with the resources would absolutely have the ability and incentive to fight something as overly broad as requesting SSL keys.

vitus 5y ago

I mean e2e as far as the connection is concerned, whether it's a server talking to end-users via HTTPS, or a server in a datacenter in Singapore talking to a server in a datacenter in Atlanta using GPG or TLS or whichever proprietary encryption algorithm you want to use. If China / HKG has that subpoena power for arbitrary SSL certificates, then we've already lost. As I mentioned, significant traffic already transits through HKG. But even so, what enforcement mechanism does China have? Facebook as well as many other services are already blocked... And honestly, if China starts using subpoena power to take control of SSL certs, that's a _very_ strong incentive to leave that market entirely, as not only can they decrypt your traffic; they can also impersonate you. "True e2e" as offered by Signal / Telecom still relies on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and therefore some notion of public / private keys with custom PKI servers. It's no different from an attacker's perspective -- instead of the global PKI infra underpinning the web, you're just dealing with a single entity. Compromise the PKI, and you can MitM to your heart's content.

nexuist 5y ago
Fair point. I was under the assumption that subpoenaing certs at least for domestic entities was common place. I guess that barrier hasn't been crossed yet, or at least we assume so?
- vitus 5y ago
  After some amount of poking around, I've found exactly one case where that happened (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit in connection with Snowden). Law enforcement might subpoena, say, search result records in connection with a specific crime (certain keywords + location + timeframe), but larger companies with the resources would absolutely have the ability and incentive to fight something as overly broad as requesting SSL keys.