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Your system may also depend upon one or more package managers that do all depend upon DNS (and hopefully e.g. DNSSEC and DoH/DoT)
by westurner 5y ago
Your system may also depend upon one or more package managers that do all depend upon DNS (and hopefully e.g. DNSSEC and DoH/DoT)
- tptacek 5y agoPackage managers don't rely on DNSSEC for package security (it would be deeply problematic if they did). But you can also just go look and see that, for instance, Ubuntu.com isn't signed, nor are most of the Pacman mirrors for Arch, nor is alpinelinux.org, &c. DNSSEC is simply not a factor in package management security. People have weird ideas about how this stuff works.
- westurner 5y agoUnfortunately all packages aren't necessarily signed either; "Which package managers require packages to be cryptographically signed?" is similar to "Which DNS clients can operate DNS resolvers that require DNSSEC signatures on DNS records to validate against the distributed trust anchors?". FWIW, `delv pkg.mirror.server.org` is how you can check DNSSEC: man systemd-resolved # nmcli man delv man dnssec-trust-anchors.d delv pkg.mirror.server.org Sigstore is a free and open Linux Foundation service for asset signatures: https://sigstore.dev/what_is_sigstore/ https://sigstore.dev/what_is_sigstore/ The TUF Overview explains some of the risks of asset signature systems; key compromise, there's one key for everything that we all share and can't log the revocation of in a CT (Certificate Transparency) log distributed like a DLT, https://theupdateframework.io/overview/ https://theupdateframework.io/overview/ Certificate Transparency: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_Transparency Yeah, there's a channel to secure there at that layer of the software supply chain as well. "PEP 480 -- Surviving a Compromise of PyPI: End-to-end signing of packages" (2014-) https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/ https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0480/ > Proposed is an extension to PEP 458 that adds support for end-to-end signing and the maximum security model. End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and developers to sign for the distributions that are downloaded by clients. The minimum security model proposed by PEP 458 supports continuous delivery of distributions (because they are signed by online keys), but that model does not protect distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised. In the minimum security model, attackers who have compromised the signing keys stored on PyPI Infrastructure may sign for malicious distributions. The maximum security model, described in this PEP, retains the benefits of PEP 458 (e.g., immediate availability of distributions that are uploaded to PyPI), but additionally ensures that end-users are not at risk of installing forged software if PyPI is compromised. One W3C Linked Data way to handle https://schema.org/SoftwareApplication https://schema.org/SoftwareApplication ( https://codemeta.github.io/user-guide/ https://codemeta.github.io/user-guide/ ) cryptographic signatures of a JSON-LD manifest with per-file and whole package hashes would be with e.g. W3C ld-signatures/ld-proofs and W3C DID (Decentralized Identifiers) or x.509 certs in a CT log.