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You don’t think there’s a possibility of timing attacks that can be used (eg use the yubikey for an account under your control on the same service)? Might be ha
by vlovich123 5y ago
You don’t think there’s a possibility of timing attacks that can be used (eg use the yubikey for an account under your control on the same service)? Might be hard for corporate keys obviously… m
Also there’s a baked in assumption that the HW for these is secure. They’re probably pretty good but I don’t know how resistant they would be to a physical attack to figure out the domains.
I agree that these attacks will get more expensive but I it’s still too early in the adoption cycle for me to conclude this is an unmitigated hard stop against these kinds of attacks vs just a speed bump.
Another area of weakness one can expect is the use of automated system accounts. Those are still in the Wild West age in terms of being constructed Willy Nilly, having lots of privileged access to internal systems without real access nor auditing controls, no expiry, and sometimes even offer login access.
- tialaramex 5y ago> You don’t think there’s a possibility of timing attacks that can be used (eg use the yubikey for an account under your control on the same service)? Might be hard for corporate keys obviously… Did this feel like a fully-formed coherent thought when you wrote it down? Because that didn't come across. A Security Key has no idea about other accounts on this service, some other service, anything like that, it's intentionally oblivious. > They’re probably pretty good but I don’t know how resistant they would be to a physical attack to figure out the domains. I think you still don't get it. The Security Key has no idea what domains it has been used with. It isn't trying to hide them from you or from bad guys, they aren't secret, it literally doesn't know.